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ABSTRACT 
 
Non-Intrusive Anomaly Detection for Encrypted Networks 
 
Luis C. Armendariz, Jr. 
 
 
The use of encryption is steadily increasing. Packet payloads that are encrypted are 
becoming increasingly difficult to analyze using IDSs. This investigation uses a new non-
intrusive IDS approach to detect network intrusions using a K-Means clustering methodology.  
It was found that this approach was able to detect many intrusions for these datasets while 
maintaining the encrypted confidentiality of packet information. This work utilized the KDD 
'99 and NSL-KDD evaluation datasets for testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I 
 
"We assumed the digital footprints we left behind  
- our clickstream exhaust, so to speak -  
were as ephemeral as a phone call,  
fleeting, passing, unrecorded... 
 
 
Our tracks through the digital sand are [in fact] eternal." 
 
- Tom Zeller Jr.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
One method of detecting an intrusion is to use an intrusion detection system 
(IDS). The IDS has the ability to monitor system or network traffic and compare 
it to a standard for analysis. Generally, a standard may be differentiated by an 
anomaly-based process utilizing behavior models or a signature-based process 
containing signatures of attack descriptions. In recent years, an effort to design 
and build systems that analyze network traffic over a variety of mediums has 
emerged. Most of the solutions utilize a type of anomaly or signature based 
approach that analyzes packet payloads for additional data. 
 
The issue with these systems is that they are unable to analyze network traffic that 
is sent over an encrypted channel, due to the payload of the packets being 
inaccessible. Only a limited quantity of IDS systems are designed to handle 
encrypted information. Many of these systems require protocol modifications or 
special infrastructures because of abnormally high false alarm rates. This paper 
will investigate a methodology to analyze encrypted network traffic with a K-
Means clustering algorithm. Additionally, it will utilize TCP traffic properties to 
evaluate the possibility of an intrusion. An intrusion detection system (IDS) can 
thus monitor network traffic for potential intrusions while maintaining the 
confidentiality of the packet information. 
 
In order to validate the effectiveness of detecting intrusions with the proposed 
methodology, the investigation will implement the proposed system using the 
KDD '99 and NSL-KDD evaluation datasets. Furthermore, the results of the 
evaluation will be compared against additional methodologies from similar 
research experiments. By doing this, the effectiveness of this strategy can be 
analyzed. 
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1.2 Statement of Problem 
Intrusion Detection systems typically utilize either a signature-based or anomaly-
based approach to analyze in-the-clear network traffic connected to a network or 
host machine. However, encrypted communications deny use of payload-related 
data. One approach to analyze encrypted networks is non-intrusive. A non-
intrusive approach will be examined to determine if utilizing a K-Means 
clustering model and TCP traffic properties will provide high precision and recall 
with a lower false rate than the only other known existing non-intrusive 
methodology. [1,49] This will be accomplished by validating the effectiveness of 
the algorithm using the KDD '99 and NSL-KDD evaluation datasets. 
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1.3 Organization 
This paper is separated into six chapters. The first chapter provides an 
introduction to intrusion detection and the initial problem statement. The second 
chapter provides a more detailed background to intrusion detection as well the 
current research in this field of study. The third chapter discusses the proposed 
intrusion detection system and the evaluation of the proposed system. The fourth 
chapter examines the data collected to either support or refute the initial theory, as 
well as discusses the final conclusions and where this work can be expanded in 
the future. Finally, the fifth and sixth chapters list the bibliography and additional 
appendices. 
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Chapter 2: Literary Review 
This chapter provides a review of the current research in the area of intrusion detection. 
The first section discusses the background and evolution of intrusion detection to its 
current methodologies. The second section provides a brief review of encryption and the 
current research related to detecting intrusions over encrypted channels. The third section 
discusses clustering methodologies. Finally, the fourth section discusses goals for next 
generation Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). 
 
2.1 Intrusion Detection 
 2.1.1 Specification 
Intrusion Detection is the process of monitoring a network or system for 
potential signs of malicious activities or policy violations. Possible types 
of incidents include violations or imminent threats of violation of 
computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security 
practices. [2]. 
 
2.1.2 Background 
In the beginning, intrusion detection was first performed by system 
administrators. The process consisted of sitting in front of a user console 
and monitoring user activities for potential intrusions. Although this 
methodology was effective at the time, this form of detection was very ad 
hoc and did not allow for scalability.  [22] 
 
However, the awareness of intrusion detection began to spread when a 
United States Air Force (USAF) paper written by James P. Anderson was 
published in 1972. This paper identified how the USAF had "become 
increasingly aware of computer security problems" and spurred people to 
begin asking questions on how to safely secure information without 
compromising security. [16][17] From this study, James P. Anderson 
published a paper in 1980 called How to use accounting audit files to detect 
unauthorized access. [18] This paper outlined many ways to improve 
computer security auditing and surveillance at customer sites, as well as 
paved a way for misuse detection in mainframe systems [16]. 
 
From here, Dorothy Denning and Peter Neumann developed the first model 
of a real-time IDS called the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) 
between 1984 and 1986. [19] Initially, this system was a rule-based system, 
trained to detect known malicious activity. However, the system was 
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refined to incorporate the statistical analysis of user profiles, becoming the 
Next-Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) [20]. Over 
time, the system was further enhanced to become the Event Monitoring 
Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) 
project. [21] 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, much of the intrusion detection research 
was based on these initial models and designs. Many projects thrived due to 
funding from the United States (U.S.) government. Projects such as 
Discovery, Haystack, Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System 
(MIDAS), Network Audit Director and Intrusion Reporter (NADIR), 
Netranger, RealSecure, and Snort were developed during this period [16]. 
  
2.1.3 Detection Techniques 
Today, there are two types of detection techniques that are commonly used to 
design Intrusion Detection Systems: Misuse Detection (MD-IDS) and Anomaly 
Detection (AD-IDS). [1] 
 
2.1.3.1 Classifications 
It is important to note though that no single IDS is perfect. [2] Each IDS 
faces unique problems and challenges, primarily due to the fact that 
network traffic continues to increase in complexity. [2] As such, erroneous 
results produced by an IDS are divided into two categories: false positives 
and false negatives. [2] 
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 Alert not generated Alert is generated 
Passive Activity 
  
Intrusive Activity 
  
Table 1: False Positives and False Negatives 
 
A false positive is a sequence of innocuous events that an IDS erroneously 
classifies as intrusive. [2][15] However, a false negative is a sequence of 
unwanted traffic or intrusion attempts that an IDS fails to detect or report. 
[2][15] 
Above all, the reduction of both false positives and false negatives is a 
critical component in intrusion detection. [15] Both create problems for 
system and security administrators and may require additional system 
calibration. [2] However, while false positives can create the burden of 
sifting through cumbersome amounts of data, they are generally more 
acceptable than false negatives. [2] This is because false negatives, as 
undetected, do not provide a security administrator with the opportunity to 
review the data. [2] 
 
2.1.3.2 Misuse Detection 
The first technique, known as Misuse Detection, focuses on identifying 
intrusions using a predetermined knowledge base [15]. Usually, this is done 
by utilizing a signature-based approach in order to search for well-known 
attack patterns. [1]  
 
True Positive 
False Positive True Negative 
False Negative 
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Figure 1: Misuse Detection Model [24][25] 
 
Each attack signature, or fingerprint, is compared with the current system 
activities in order to find strange or abusive use of a network or system.  
 
 
Figure 2: Detecting a Signature [26] 
 
As such, MD-IDSs have shown to have quick detection speeds and 
manageable configurations [2], as well as produce a low number of false 
positives [15]. Commercial implementations have also seen widespread 
adoption and success. [16][20]  
However, signature-based systems and approaches are reactive by nature 
[10][11] and thus restricted to recognizing only known attacks. 
Additionally, an attacker has the ability to modify an attack, rendering it 
undetectable by a MD-IDS. [2]  
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Figure 3: Detection of Signature Modifications [23] 
 
As a result, MD-IDSs often produce a high number of false negatives, and 
their efficiency is dependent upon continuous updates and response times. 
[1] 
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2.1.3.3 Anomaly Detection 
The second technique is known as Anomaly Detection. This process 
utilizes a heuristic-based approach, in order to build a model of the 
"normal" system or network behavior. [1] Using this model, or profile, 
intrusions can be detected as anomalies, or deviations, from the expected 
behavior of the system. [1] 
 
 
Figure 4: Anomaly Detection [27] 
 
The primary advantage of this approach is that AD-IDSs are able to detect 
new and yet unknown threats. [1] This provides additional support that 
signature-based systems are unable to supply. 
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Figure 5: New and Unknown Threats [28] 
 
As such, a wide variety of methods have been explored in order to 
approach the anomaly detection issue, including neural networks, artificial 
intelligence, data mining algorithms, genetic algorithms, and statistical 
models. [15]  
However, AD-IDSs are prone to an increased amount of false positives, 
since a variety of factors can contribute to producing an anomalous 
behavior (e.g. implementation errors). [15]  Furthermore, the allocation of a 
training phase to develop the analysis model may also be required, 
depending upon the approach. 
 
2.1.4 Implementations 
The placement of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is another vital aspect of 
the system's effectiveness. [1] Depending on whether the system is designed to 
monitor traffic to a single host or a network of devices, can also determine what 
types of intrusions the system may encounter. As such, many IDSs today often 
utilize one of two common implementation approaches. 
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2.1.4.1 Host-based Intrusion Detection System 
The first approach uses a host centric design, where an IDS requires a small 
program, or agent, to be installed on a single device or machine. This type 
of implementation is known as a Host-based Intrusion Detection System 
(HIDS). [2] 
 
 
Figure 6: Host-based Intrusion Detection System Setup [31] 
 
One primary advantage of this implementation is that it allows a HIDS to 
access and analyze system-specific settings and information in order to 
detect intrusions. [1][2] This includes the local security policy [2], the file 
system, network events, system calls [15], system commands, system logs, 
and security logs. [14] Thus, it is important for a HIDS to appropriately 
choose the system characteristics it will monitor. [15] 
However, the primary concern with this implementation is that a HIDS 
agent must be installed on the machine it intends to analyze. [2] As such, 
configuration settings must be specific to that machine, operating system, 
and software [2], limiting the HIDS in scalability and increasing the 
complexity of system management. 
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2.1.4.2 Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
The second approach utilizes a network centric design, where an IDS is 
placed on a network to monitor information that is passed between multiple 
hosts or to a unique device. This type of implementation is known as a 
Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). 
 
 
Figure 7: Network-based Intrusion Detection System Setup [31] 
 
Usually, this setup consists of a network application, or sensor, integrated 
together with a Network Interface Card (NIC). The NIC operates in 
promiscuous mode in order to collect the traffic or data, while a separate 
interface is used for management of the system. 
The primary advantage of a NIDS setup is that it is able to analyze traffic at 
all layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model [2] and detect 
attacks against the network as a whole. [1] A few examples of this would 
be distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks, policy violations, and 
various classes of malware. [14] 
However, a NIDS is limited to the data that is made available by the 
network. As such, unique system information such as audit logs is often 
restricted or unavailable for analysis. 
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2.1.5 Current Research 
  2.1.5.1 Threats 
Today, many well-known attacks and new types of threats can be detected 
and impeded from causing harm. [1] However, all systems suffer from 
security vulnerabilities and are subject to electronic attacks.  
With the commercial success of the Internet and the ability to carry out 
attacks from afar, e-Crime has evolved into a multi-billion dollar market. 
[1,32]. Malicious code has now proliferated through the development and 
distribution of attack kits, requiring no in-depth technical knowledge. [1] 
Each professional kit contributes to the growing numbers of new signatures 
with each set of new code. [1]  
As the world continues to connect with the cyberworld, attackers are 
becoming more sophisticated using automated tools to penetrate systems 
and organizing highly coordinated and intricate attacks. [2] As such, 
targeted attacks have also increased [32-33], including the most recent 
commercial attacks on Nintendo[3-4], Ubisoft[5], and Sony [6-9]. Small 
businesses have become more viable targets, accounting for fifty percent of 
all targeted attacks in 2012. [33] Furthermore, the number of cyber 
espionage attacks on military targets has also increased, such as the Flamer 
and Gauss worms [33] and recent Social Engineering exploits [34]. 
The dissemination of malicious software and packages is not restricted to 
networks anymore. Flash drives used as promotional prizes have become 
popular instruments for Trojans. [1] Once a device is connected to a 
computer, the Trojan installs itself onto the host system or network, 
bypassing the security systems. Additionally, formerly secure systems such 
as Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) can be 
compromised with the use of offline-propagation. [1] Thus, protecting a 
system from only external threats is not enough. 
With the evolution of technology and the interconnectivity provided by the 
Internet, additional problems continue to arise. One important note is the 
shift from attacks directed at operating systems or network protocols to 
attacks utilizing vulnerabilities in the application layer. [1] As new 
applications are created and developed, the potential for flawed program 
  
14 
 
code to enter the market continues to increase. As such, the quantity of 
Zero-Day vulnerabilities has increased in recent years. [1] 
While vendors continue to supply consumers with patches and updates to 
discovered vulnerabilities, these updates may sometimes be delayed 
utilizing a fixed patch-day policy. [1] Even more so, many users may not 
take the appropriate safety precautions, due to often strenuous, complex, or 
often changing security configurations. As such, the most successful 
exploits are often utilizing vulnerabilities that were reported more than a 
year ago. [1]  
 
2.1.5.2 Increased Security Measures 
Based on these recent changes, more and more services are beginning to 
offer protected access, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). This trend 
will continue to grow, through the use of IPv6 IPSec [1].  
However, many available systems will be unable to cope or scale to 
challenges like encryption, since it denies the use of payload data for 
evaluation. [1]   
As IDS technologies continue to evolve, encryption will continue to 
become a crucial factor to train the application of IDSs. [1,2] 
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2.2. Encryption Analysis 
 2.2.1 Encryption with Intrusion Detection 
Today, encryption is becoming a more common component and entity in data 
communications. Protocols such as TLS and IPSec offer services that help in  
safeguarding private information. However, as a result, common IDS structures 
and systems are unable to analyze packet payloads in order to detect intrusions. 
As such, new methodologies have been examined in order to integrate common 
intrusion detection designs with encrypted networks. 
 
 2.2.2 Methodologies 
2.2.2.1 Protocol-based 
The first methodology is a protocol-based approach, where malicious 
activity is detected based on misuse of the encryption protocol. [1] 
The primary advantage of this approach is that common attacks based on 
vulnerabilities in the protocol can be analyzed and detected. However, this 
approach is limited mainly to the misuse of the encryption protocol. As 
such, additional attack vectors such as application-level attacks (e.g. SQL 
injection, buffer overflow, cross-site request forgery) are usually not 
detected since the payload of the packets is not decrypted and analyzed. [1] 
For example, Joglekar et al. [46] developed an anomaly-based IDS for 
detecting malicious use of cryptographic and application-level protocols. 
This system, denoted as ProtoMon, instrumented shared libraries for these 
protocols in order to detect intrusions. As the monitoring was integrated 
into the protocol handling, attacks on the encryption protocol were able to 
be detected. However, malicious activities hidden within the encrypted 
channel remained undetected. 
  
2.2.2.2 Intrusive 
The next methodology is an intrusive approach, where modifications are 
implemented onto the network architecture or the encryption protocol. [1]  
The main advantage of this approach is that it provides a way to perform 
deep packet inspection of payloads while maintaining the confidentiality of 
the information. However, this approach strongly depends on modifications 
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to the protocols and the network infrastructure. As such, this creates heavy 
management overhead and is often  limited in scalability.  
For example, Goh et al. [47-48] proposed and developed a detection 
framework that allowed a NIDS to analyze network traffic without 
compromising the confidentiality of a VPN. This approach was able to 
detect application-level attacks and evasion attacks; however, it was limited 
in scalability due to increased network overhead and implementation 
challenges. 
 
2.2.2.3 Non-Intrusive 
The last methodology is a non-intrusive approach, where statistical models 
and analysis methods are applied to encrypted traffic. [1] 
The primary advantage with this approach is that it provides a way to 
analyze network traffic without relying on packet payloads. Furthermore,  
it maintains the confidentially of the information without modifications to 
the network infrastructure. However, application-level attacks may not be 
detected since the payload is not decrypted and analyzed. [1] Additionally, 
this strategy also has the potential to have a high false positive rate, 
decreasing its suitability to an online implementation. 
In one approach, Foroushani et al. [49] proposed a system to detect 
anomalous behaviors in SSH2 encrypted accesses, using intrusion 
signatures generated from traffic information (e.g. access frequency, TCP 
traffic specifications). This system was able to detect a variety of attacks 
with high accuracy; however, it was not suitable to online implementation 
due to a high false alarm rate. 
 
2.3 Clustering Analysis 
In this section, an introduction is given to common clustering methodologies and 
approaches. The first area gives an overview of clustering and a few of its main 
advantages for data analysis. The second area discusses clustering models and common 
algorithms and approaches that have been utilized in research. The third area discusses 
common clustering techniques that have been used to classify data. The last section 
discusses current clustering research specific to the K-Means algorithm. 
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 2.3.1 Clustering Overview 
Clustering is the process of organizing a set of objects in such a way that 
information in the same group, or cluster, is more similar than to information in 
other groups, or clusters. [35]  
It has a vast history, expanding across disciplines such as biology, psychology, 
geology, and marketing. [36] Today, this process of analyzing data and 
information is found in many fields, including machine learning, pattern 
recognition, and information retrieval. [36]  
One of the main advantages of clustering is that it allows the analysis of cluster  
groups containing similar objects rather than the analysis of each individual object 
from a respective data set. However, the notion of a “cluster” cannot be precisely 
defined, as the process of clustering is the general task to be solved. [35] As such, 
there are many different types of clustering models, with each model employing a 
different inductive principle for the definition of a cluster. Furthermore, each 
induction principle contains many clustering algorithms that may be used for data 
analysis. [35] 
 
2.3.2 Clustering Models 
A clustering model is the basic structure that is used to represent a cluster, or a 
group of data. This model usually relies on an inductive principle, in order to 
define a cluster, as well as a clustering criterion to select a “best fit” structure 
given a set of data. [35] By defining what the clustering criterion is, it also aids in 
accounting for the similarity between the cluster groups. [35]  
For example, one commonly implemented clustering model is the probabilistic 
model. This may utilize an inductive principle such as the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) approach, which states to choose the model that maximizes the probability 
of the data being generated by such a model. [35] The clustering criterion would 
be the mathematical expression of the inductive principle, while the clustering 
algorithm would implement this criterion such as the Expectation Maximisation 
method. [35]  
However, it is also common for the names of clustering models to be used 
interchangeably with the inductive principle. As such, it has become difficult to 
identify if the clustering model name refers more to the model or the induction 
principle. [35] 
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A few common clustering methods are hierarchical clustering, partitional 
clustering, distribution clustering, and density clustering. 
 
2.3.2.1 Hierarchical Clustering 
Hierarchical Clustering, or connectivity models, builds a model based on 
the distance between connected objects. The core inductive principle is 
based on the guideline that objects are more related to nearby objects than 
to far away objects. As such, algorithms that utilize this model develop 
clusters based on object distances and represent clusters using a 
dendrogram, or tree diagram.  
 
 
Figure 8: Hierarchical clustering points within 3 clusters [36] 
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Figure 9: Hierarchical clustering dendrogram from single-link algorithm [36] 
 
However, each algorithm differs by how the distances for each object are 
computed. A few common algorithms for connectivity models are the 
Linkage Clustering algorithms, including single-link, complete-link, and 
average link clustering. Of these algorithms, single-link clustering and 
complete-link clustering are most common. [36] 
In single-link clustering, the distance between two clusters is the minimum 
of the distances between all pairs of patterns drawn from the two clusters. 
[36] However, in complete-link clustering, the distance is the maximum of 
all pairs of patterns derived from the two clusters. [36] As such, complete-
link clustering produces tightly bound clusters, while single-link clustering 
suffers from a chaining effect. In contrast, single-link clustering is more 
versatile than complete-link clustering, even though noisy patterns may 
develop. [36] 
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Figure 10: Single-link clustering with 2 data sets connected by noisy patterns [36] 
 
 
Figure 11: Complete-link clustering with 2 data sets connected by noisy patterns [36] 
 
While this clustering methodology is useful in organizing a set of objects 
into a dendrogram, it does have its disadvantages. First, most hierarchical 
algorithms’ results are not produced as a unique partitioning of a data set 
but as a hierarchy. As such, a user would still need to choose the 
appropriate clusters from the results. Second, this methodology is not 
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robust against outliers and can cause either additional clusters to form or 
other clusters to merge (i.e. Chaining Phenomenon). [36] Lastly, the 
complexity for most connectivity model algorithms is usually on the scale 
of O(n
3
). Even optimized methods for these algorithms are on a scale of 
O(n
2
). As such, many of these algorithms are too slow for large data sets. 
[36] 
 
2.3.2.2 Partitional Clustering 
In partitional clustering, or centroid models, a single partition of the data is 
obtained instead of utilizing a clustering structure. [36] The primary 
inductive principle in this approach is that a cluster is represented by a 
central vector, which may or may not be a member of the original data set. 
A few algorithms that are common in this approach are the squared error 
algorithms and the graph-based algorithms. [36]  
 
2.3.2.2.1 Squared Error Algorithms 
The squared error algorithms utilize one of the most frequently used 
criterion functions in partitional clustering. This technique is known 
as the squared error criterion.  
In this methodology, an initial partition is selected with a fixed 
number of clusters and cluster centers. Each data object or pattern is 
assigned to a cluster center, while cluster centers are continuously 
recomputed. Clusters are continuously split and merged again using 
heuristics information  [36], until the algorithm converges or cannot 
be improved. 
The primary goal of this operation is to obtain a partition for a fixed 
number of clusters that minimizes the squared-error value, or the 
objective function. [39,40] This value is the sum of the distances 
between each individual object or pattern and its cluster center. [39] 
An example of the clustering equation may be found in the figure 
below.  
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Figure 12: Example of Squared Error Criterion Equation [40] 
     
For a clustering of a pattern set ( ) containing K clusters, the value 
  
   
 is the i
th
 pattern belonging to the j
th
 cluster and cj is the centroid 
of the j
th
 cluster. 
The squared error criterion function is often effective with isolated 
and compact clusters. Furthermore, the Euclidean distance function 
is commonly used in conjunction with this approach. One of the 
most commonly used squared error algorithms is the K-Means 
clustering algorithm. [36] 
 
2.3.2.2.2 K-Means Clustering 
For the K-Means algorithm (i.e. Lloyd's algorithm), the methodology 
builds upon the basic principles of squared error algorithms. First, a 
random initial partition is selected with n objects and k cluster 
centers. Then, each data object is assigned to the closest cluster 
center, or the cluster with the nearest mean.  Once this is 
accomplished, each cluster center is recomputed and a new set of k 
cluster centers are utilized to reassign objects. Convergence is 
achieved when no or minimal objects are reassigned to new cluster 
centers or when the squared error value ceases to decrease 
significantly. [36,40] 
The K-Means algorithm is used quite often due to its implementation 
ease and its O(n) time complexity. However, one disadvantage with 
this technique is that it is sensitive to the selection of the initial 
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partition and may converge at a local minimum of the criterion 
function value instead of the global minimum. [36]  
There are also several variations to the K-Means algorithm strategy. 
For example, some implementations allow the separation and 
aggregation of resulting clusters in order to select a more optimal 
partition. [36] Other variations may utilize different criterion 
functions in order to optimize the results, such as the dynamic 
clustering algorithm. [36]  
Additional discussions for variations, modifications, and 
optimizations to the K-Means algorithm may be found in Section 
2.3.3 Clustering Research. 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Graph-Theoretic Clustering 
In graph-based algorithms, the main approach is to construct a  
minimal spanning tree (MST) for the data. Using this tree, the MST 
edges with the largest lengths may be removed one-by-one, in order 
to generate the appropriate clusters. [36] An example of this process 
may be found in the figure below. 
 
Figure 13: Graph-Theoretic Clustering MST [36] 
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One interesting point to note is that hierarchical clustering 
approaches are also related to graph-theoretic clustering models. For 
example, single-link clusters are subgraphs of the MST, while 
complete-link clusters are maximal complete subgraphs, considered 
the strictest definition of a cluster. [36] 
 
2.3.2.3 Distribution Clustering 
In Distribution Clustering, or distribution models, the primary inductive 
principle is that the patterns to be clustered are part of one or more 
distributions. Thus, the goal is to identify each of the input parameters and 
their corresponding number. [36] As such, this methodology is closely 
related to statistical approaches. 
The most prominent algorithm used in this approach is the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm, also referred to as EM-Clustering.  
 
2.3.2.3.1 EM Clustering 
In EM-Clustering, the data set is often modeled using a fixed number 
of Gaussian distributions. Each distribution is randomly initialized 
using a set of mixing parameters. With each iterative pass, the 
parameters are rescored and optimized in order to better match the 
data set. [36] 
Overall, this methodology produces a set of clusters and complex 
models for these clusters that are able to capture correlation and 
dependence attributes. However, one key issue with this strategy is 
that it may suffer from overfitting, or when the statistical model may 
describe a random error or noise instead of the underlying 
relationship. Additionally, many real data sets may not have a 
mathematical model available for the algorithm to optimize. Thus, an 
additional burden is placed on the user to choose the appropriate data 
models for the analysis. 
 
2.3.2.4 Density Clustering 
In Density Clustering, or density models, the core inductive principle 
defines a cluster as a region in a data set with higher object density. Objects 
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that may be found or located near sparse areas are defined as noise or 
cluster border points. [37] A few algorithms that are common in this 
approach are the DBSCAN, OPTICS, and the DeLi-Clu algorithms.  
The DBSCAN algorithm, or density-based spatial clustering of applications 
with noise, is one of the most commonly used density-clustering methods 
and utilizes the notion of density-reachability. Likewise, the OPTICS 
algorithm, or ordering points to identify the clustering structure, may be 
viewed as a generalization of the DBSCAN algorithm to multiple ranges. 
While each algorithm offers advantages similar to those of the Linkage 
Clustering algorithms, the primary drawback is that the algorithms expect a 
type of density drop in order to detect cluster borders. As such, they are not 
able to detect intrinsic cluster structures which are commonly prevalent in 
real-time data sets.  
The DeLi-Clu, or Density Link-Clustering, algorithm, merges ideas found 
in both OPTICS and Single-Link clustering. This reduces the required 
amount of defined parameters and offers performance improvements over 
OPTICS by using an R-tree index. 
 
2.3.3 Clustering Techniques  
Similar to clustering models, there are also a variety of clustering techniques that 
can be applied to various clustering algorithms. These techniques may aid in 
defining the guidelines for the algorithm or clustering criterion.  
 
2.3.3.1 Agglomerative vs Divisive 
This technique relates to the algorithmic structure and operation. In an 
agglomerative approach, each pattern is defined within a distinct cluster 
and continuously merged until a specified stopping criterion is reached. 
However, in a divisive approach, all patterns are defined within a single 
cluster and continuously split until a specified stopping criterion is 
satisfied. [36] 
 
2.3.3.1 Hard vs Soft Clustering 
This technique relates to the how the algorithm places objects or patterns 
within defined clusters. A hard clustering approach places each data object 
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within a single cluster, during operation and output. However, a soft 
clustering (i.e. fuzzy clustering) approach assigns each data object to a set 
of clusters using relative degrees of memberships. [36] 
 
2.3.4 Clustering Research  
Recently, there have been many new research developments with regards to 
improvements or modifications to the K-Means clustering strategy. Many of these 
variations offer additional insight as to how to improve the accuracy of the 
detection algorithm and reduce the computational expenses. 
For example,  Xiao et. al. [38,50] proposed an approach where the K-Means 
algorithm was associated with the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm. 
This approach, denoted as PSO-KM, produced results that maintained a high 
accuracy when detecting probe attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and user-
to-root (U2R) attacks. It was also effective in converging towards a global 
optimum rather than a K-Means local optimum. However, the approach produced 
low results in detecting root-to-local (R2L) attacks and was unable to overcome 
the K-Means dependency on the number of clusters. 
In another study, Gaddam et al. [41] proposed a supervised anomaly detection 
approach, known as K-Means+ID3, which cascaded K-Means clustering with ID3 
decision tree learning methods. This combined approach showed improved 
performance measures relative to its individual counterparts. A similar study was 
done by Yasami et al. [44] where the approach was refined to provide an  
unsupervised classification for ARP anomaly detection.  
Additional variations include K-Medoids, which represents clusters with the data 
median value rather than the mean [42], and Fuzzy c-means (i.e. Soft K-Means, 
Fuzzy K-Means) which is an extension of the K-Means algorithm that allows data 
points to be associated with multiple clusters using membership values. [42]  An 
improved methodology was proposed by Ensafi et al. [43] which associated Fuzzy 
K-Means with PSO, denoted as SFK-means. This approach provided solutions to 
the local convergence problem in Fuzzy K-Means and the sharp boundary 
problem in Swarm K-Means. However, the SFK-means algorithm suffered from a 
high false positive rate, as well as a high computation overhead in terms of 
memory requirements and CPU times.  
Another methodology offered by Tian et. al. [45], proposed an improved K-
Means algorithm that utilized the K-Medoids cyclic method and the improved 
trilateral relations theorem. This approach produced results that improved the 
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false detection rate of abnormality and reduced computation time to a certain 
extent. 
 
2.4 Goals of Next-Generation IDS 
Based on the shortcomings of current IDSs, Koch[1] identified a set of unique goals that 
aid in the development of a Next-Generation IDS. A few of these goals that the proposed 
methodology focuses on are given below: 
1. First, an IDS must aim to support a behavior-based analysis. Due to the increase 
in the number of Zero Days, targeted attacks, and encrypted communications, it is 
often not feasible to rely on the availability of signatures. [1] Furthermore, the 
efficiency of near-real time evaluation of patterns in server systems is limited to 
both the amount of traffic as well as the size of integrated databases and the 
quantity of patterns. [1] 
 
2. Second, an IDS must aim to support the exclusion of a learning phase. Many IDSs 
using Anomaly Detection techniques often require the inclusion of a learning 
phase; however, retrieving clean labeled data based on a production environment 
is often unavailable. Thus, Koch[1] recommends the implementation of other 
techniques that provide solutions for this issue such as unsupervised learning or 
neural networks.  
 
3. Third, the evaluation of a packet's payload must be abstained, if not prohibited. 
As the use of encryption increases, the ability to analyze packet payloads becomes 
very elaborate. Data becomes inaccessible or requires great computational 
complexity to evaluate. Thus, reliance on the availability of packet payloads 
becomes increasingly infeasible.[1] 
 
4. Fourth, an IDS must aim to support the implementation of a network-centric 
design. While host-based implementations hold several advantages with regard to 
the availability of information (e.g. decrypted data; log files), the management is 
often complex, error-prone, and limited in scalability. However, network-based 
installations are able to recognize distributed and sophisticated attacks against the 
network as a whole. [1] 
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2.5 Comparison to Works 
All of the approaches discussed in the above sections, except Foroushani [49], do not 
meet all of the goals identified by Koch [1] above for a next-generation intrusion 
detection system. Foroushani [49] is the only known existing non-intrusive approach that 
meets all of these goals to date. 
This paper will analyze a new non-intrusive approach that is consistent with each of the 
four goals above required for a next-generation intrusion detection system and compare 
with Foroushani [49]. [see Fig. 14 pg. 24] 
 
2.6 Contributions 
The contributions of the paper are enumerated as follows:  
1. The paper presents a non-intrusive approach to detect network intrusions across 
encrypted accesses using a K-Means clustering algorithm and TCP traffic 
properties, while maintaining the confidentiality of packet payload information. 
 
2. The paper evaluates the performance of the proposed methodology and compares 
it with the only other known existing non-intrusive approach using five 
performance measures. [1,49] 
 
3. The paper presents a non-intrusive approach for analyzing information that is 
consistent with four of the goals required for a next-generation intrusion detection 
system. 
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Chapter 3: Setup and Evaluation 
3.1 Setup 
For this investigation, a Windows 7 setup will be utilized running a Java 1.7 
environment. The specifications of the investigation setup may be found in the table 
below. 
 
Operating System Windows 7 Home Premium SP 1 
System Type 64-bit 
Memory 8.00 GB 
Processor Intel
®
 Core
TM
 i7-2820QM CPU 
@ 2.30GHz 2.30GHz 
Hard Drive 700 GB 
Table 2: System Information 
 
3.2 Data Sets 
During the investigation, two evaluation datasets will be used: the KDD Cup '99 dataset 
and the NSL-KDD dataset. 
  
3.2.1 KDD Cup '99 Dataset  
The Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) 1999 dataset is derived from 
the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation datasets. Under the sponsorship 
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL), MIT Lincoln Labs collected and distributed the 
DARPA datasets for the evaluation of network intrusion detection systems.  
The KDD '99 dataset consists of 41 features and one class attribute for each 
connection record.  Of these 41 features, nine are basic features of individual TCP 
connections. These features may be found in the table below.  
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Feature Name Description Type 
Duration Length (number of seconds of the connection) Continuous 
Protocol_type Type of the protocol (e.g. tcp, udp, etc.) Discrete 
Service Network service on the destination (e.g. http, telnet, etc.) Discrete 
Src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination Continuous 
Dst_bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source Continuous 
Flag Normal or error status of the connection Discrete 
Land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Wrong_fragment Number of "wrong" fragments Continuous 
Urgent Number of Urgent packets Continuous 
Table 3: Basic features of individual TCP connections [56] 
The remaining fields are higher-level features defined by Stolfo et. al. to help in 
distinguishing normal connections from attacks. [56] These features are grouped 
in one of several categories. 
The first category consists of  same-host features. These features examine only 
connections within the past two second interval that have the same destination 
host as the current connection and calculate statistics related to protocol behavior, 
service, and more. [56] Likewise, same-service features examine only connections 
within the past two second interval that have the same service as the current 
connection. [56] The same-host and same-service features together are called 
time-based traffic features of the connection records. [56] These features may be 
found in the table below. 
 
Feature Name Description Type 
Count Number of connections to the same host as the current 
connection in the past two seconds 
Continuous 
Note: The following features refer to these same-host connections. 
Serror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors Continuous 
Rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors Continuous 
Same_srv_rate % of connections to the same service Continuous 
Diff_srv_rate % of connections to different services Continuous 
Srv_count Number of connections to the same service as the current 
connection in the past two seconds 
Continuous 
Note: The following features refer to these same-service connections. 
Srv_serror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors Continuous 
Srv_rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors Continuous 
Srv_diff_host_rate % of connections that have different hosts Continuous 
Table 4: Time-based traffic features [56] 
 
The second category contains host-based traffic features. [56] These features were 
derived with respect to attacks that use a much larger time interval than two 
seconds (e.g. probing attacks scanning once per minute). As such connection 
records were sorted by destination host, and features were constructed using a 
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window of 100 connections to the same host instead of a time window. [56] These 
features may be found in the table below. 
 
Feature Name Description Type 
Dst_host_count Number of connections to the same host as the current 
connection. 
Continuous 
Dst_host_srerror_rate % of connections that have "SYN" errors Continuous 
Dst_host_rerror_rate % of connections that have "REJ" errors Continuous 
Dst_host_same_srv_rate % of connections to the same service Continuous 
Dst_host_diff_srv_rate % of connections to different services Continuous 
Dst_host_srv_count Number of connections to the same service as the current 
connection. 
Continuous 
Dst_host_srv_serror_rate % of connections to same service that have "SYN" errors Continuous 
Dst_host_srv_rerror_rate % of connections to same service that have "REJ" errors Continuous 
Dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to different hosts Continuous 
Dst_host_same_src_port_rate % of connections that were to the same source port Continuous 
Table 5: Host-based traffic features [71] 
 
The last category consists of content features. [56] Unlike DoS and Probing 
attacks, R2L and U2R attacks do not have intrusion frequent sequential patterns. 
[54] This is mainly due in part to DoS and Probing attacks utilizing many 
connections to some host(s) in a short period of time, while R2L and U2R attacks 
are embedded in the data portions of the packets utilizing only a single 
connection. [54] Thus, in order to detect these kinds of attacks, content features 
were added using domain knowledge, in order to look for suspicious behavior in 
the data portions (e.g. number of failed login attempts). [56] A list of these 
features may be found in the table below.  
 
Feature Name Description Type 
Hot Number of "hot" indicators Continuous 
Num_failed_logins Number of failed login attempts Continuous 
Logged_in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Num_compromised Number of "compromised" conditions Continuous 
Root_shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Su_attempted 1 if "su root" command attempted; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Num_root Number of "root" accesses Continuous 
Num_file_creations Number of file creation operations Continuous 
Num_shells Number of shell prompts Continuous 
Num_access_files Number of operations on access control files Continuous 
Num_outbound_cmds Number of outbound commands in an ftp session Continuous 
Is_hot_login 1 if the login belongs to the "hot" list; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Is_guest_login 1 if the login is a "guest" login; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Table 6: Content features within a connection suggested by domain knowledge [56] 
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Lastly, the class attribute consists of 1 of 21 classes that fall under four types of 
attacks [55-56]. These classes and attack types may be found in the tables below. 
Class Name Attack Type 
Back DoS 
Buffer_overflow U2R 
ftp_write R2L 
Guess_passwd R2L 
Imap R2L 
Ipsweep Probe 
Land DoS 
Loadmodule U2R 
Multihop R2L 
Neptune DoS 
Nmap Probe 
Perl U2R 
Phf R2L 
Pod DoS 
Portsweep Probe 
Rootkit U2R 
Satan Probe 
Smurf DoS 
Spy R2L 
Teardrop DoS 
Warezclient R2L 
Warezmaster R2L 
Table 7: List of Classes [56] 
Attack Type Description 
Probing (Probe) Surveillance and other probing (e.g. port scanning) 
Remote-to-Local (R2L) Unauthorized access from a remote machine  
(e.g. guessing password) 
User-to-Root (U2R) Unauthorized access to local superuser (root) 
privileges (e.g. buffer overflow attacks) 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Denial of Service (e.g. syn flood) 
Table 8: Types of attacks [56] 
 
Although the KDD Cup '99 dataset has become a widely used dataset for the 
evaluation of detection systems, it does suffer from a few shortcomings [54]. As 
such, a newer dataset was proposed to handle many of these issues, called the 
NSL-KDD dataset. [54] 
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3.2.2 NSL-KDD Dataset  
The NSL-KDD dataset is a reduced version of the original KDD '99 dataset to 
handle many of the KDD '99 shortcomings. [55] It was proposed by Tavallaee et 
al. [54] in 2009 and includes some of the following differences over the original 
KDD '99 dataset: 
1. First, the training set does not include redundant records. This aids in 
preventing the classifiers from being biased towards frequent records. [57] 
2. Second, the test sets do not include duplicate records. This prevents the 
performance of learning algorithms from being biased towards methods which 
yield better detection rates on frequent records. [57] 
3. Third, the number of selected records from each difficulty level group is 
inversely proportional to the percentage of records in the original KDD '99 
dataset. As a result, the classification rates of distinct learning methods vary in 
a wider range, increasing the accuracy of evaluation of different learning 
techniques. [57] 
4. Last, the number of records in both the training and test datasets are 
reasonable, allowing experiments to run the complete datasets without the 
need to randomly select a smaller portion. As such, this allows the evaluation 
results of different research works to be more consistent and comparable. [57] 
  
3.3 Proposed System 
The proposed intrusion detection system (IDS) will consist of three primary areas. [15] 
1. Data Initialization 
2. K-Means Clustering (Unsupervised) 
3. Intrusion Detection Analysis 
 
An overview of this process may be found in the figure below. 
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Figure 14: Overview of System Specifications 
 
First, the system will extract information from a respective dataset. This information 
includes intrinsic attributes from the header's area of network packets (i.e. TCP traffic 
properties), time-based attributes, host-based attributes, content attributes, and a class 
attribute each related to the network data. [71] A list of each of these attributes with their 
respective descriptions may be found above in the dataset section in Table 3 through 
Table 8.  
Then, once the information is retrieved, the K-Means Clustering algorithm will sort the 
data into cluster groups for analysis. This will allow for various actions to be identified 
based on the similarity of the information. In order to accomplish this task, four primary 
steps will be utilized: selecting K cluster centers to initialize each cluster group, assigning 
data patterns to cluster groups using the cluster centers, updating the cluster centers using 
the new pattern sets, and then checking for convergence of the algorithm based on a 
stopping criterion.  
Finally, attacks will be detected according to the TCP traffic properties of the cluster 
centers. This will include features such as the number of bytes from source to destination 
and vice-versa.  
The next set of subsections will discuss the applied methodology in more detail. 
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3.3.1 Data Initialization  
The first area of the proposed IDS is the data initialization module. In this phase, 
traffic data is extracted and formatted to be analyzed for the K-Means clustering 
algorithm.  An overview of this process may be found in the figure below.  
 
Figure 15: Overview of initializing variables and retrieving data for clustering 
In the first step, system variables are initialized for processing. This includes 
essential information such as the name and location of the dataset to be processed 
(e.g. KDD or NSL-KDD), the token for how the data is delimited, the volume to 
store the data patterns as they are retrieved, as well as additional variables that 
will be used throughout the experiment. 
Next, information from the selected dataset is retrieved through the use of a 
filereader. The "kddcup.data" file (KDD) and the "KDDTrain+" file (NSL-KDD) 
will be used to evaluate the proposed system, since they each contain the largest 
quantity of labeled evaluation data from their respective datasets. This will allow 
the data to be compared to a known standard of effectiveness in order to validate 
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the methodology, once the analysis phase has completed. Additionally, as each 
data element is retrieved, the service feature of the element is analyzed for 
protocols supporting encrypted communications during the collection of the 
original datasets. This will allow the system to analyze data features that 
supported encrypted communications, restricting use of the packet information. 
For this experiment, Secure Shell (i.e. SSH) traffic data will be focused on and 
extracted from each of the datasets. The details and information related to each of 
the specific dataset files may be found in the table below. 
 KDD Cup '99 NSL-KDD 
Total Data Lines 4,898,431 125,973 
Total Passive Activities 972,780 67,343 
Total Intrusive Activities 3,925,651 58,630 
Total DoS Attacks 3,883,370 45,927 
Total U2R Attacks 52 52 
Total R2L Attacks 1,126 995 
Total Probe Attacks 41,102 11,656 
Total SSH Data Lines 1,075 311 
Total SSH Passive Activities 7 5 
Total SSH Intrusive Activities 1,068 306 
Total SSH DoS Attacks 1,039 281 
Total SSH U2R Attacks 0 0 
Total SSH R2L Attacks 0 0 
Total SSH Probe Attacks 29 25 
Table 9: KDD and NSL-KDD Dataset Information 
 
As each data element is extracted, it is added to a preformatted array list, or 
volume. Once this operation has completed, each set of data is normalized using a 
log transform strategy. The equation for the log normalization may be found area 
below.  
                
Where Xij = the value of feature j for observation i before normalization 
X'ij = the value after normalization is applied 
By normalizing the data, it allows for the contributions of different data attributes 
to be weighed in a manner such that the distance between observations becomes 
meaningful. [75] This will allow the K-Means clustering algorithm to begin to 
process and group the extracted data.  
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3.3.2 K-Means Clustering (Unsupervised) 
In the second area of the proposed IDS, the K-Means clustering module sorts the 
data into cluster groups for analysis. The algorithm accomplishes this task through 
four steps, as seen in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 16: Overview of K-Means Clustering Algorithm 
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First, k cluster centers are chosen to coincide with k randomly defined points from 
the respective dataset. In order to accomplish this task, a strategy similar to the 
Forgy methodology is implemented, where k pattern sets (i.e. data lines) are 
randomly selected from the volume containing the selected dataset and used as the 
initial cluster means, or centers. [58]  
 
 
Figure 17: Selection of K Cluster Centers 
For this experiment, the initial starting value of K will be set to the general rule of 
thumb proposed by Mardia et al. [59]:  
 
   
 
 
 
Where   = total number of data patterns 
 
As such, using the information provided in Table 9 above, the K values for each 
dataset can be calculated. These values may be found in the table below. 
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 Total Data 
Lines 
K  
(Total) 
Total SSH 
Data Lines 
K 
(SSH) 
KDD Cup '99 4,898,431 1,564 1,075 23 
NSL-KDD 125,973 250 311 12 
Table 10: KDD and NSL-KDD Dataset K Values 
 
The KDD Cup '99 dataset contains 4,898,431 total patterns with 1,075 SSH 
specific data patterns. This generates a K value of 1,564 clusters when operating 
on the complete data set, and a K value of 23 when examining the SSH specific 
information. Likewise, the NSL-KDD dataset contains 125,973 total patterns with 
311 SSH specific data patterns. As such, this generates a K value of 250 clusters 
when operating on the full data set, and a K value of 12 when examining the SSH 
information. 
Each cluster center, or centroid (c), is also associated with the mean value of that 
cluster's assigned pattern set. Thus, as patterns are assigned to clusters, the cluster 
centroids are able to be updated as needed. 
Next, each pattern from the respective dataset is assigned to a cluster. This is 
accomplished by comparing each pattern (p) to each cluster centroid (c) through 
the implementation of the Euclidean Distance function. An overview of the 
process may be found in the figure below. 
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Figure 18: Pattern Assignment 
 
As each pattern is examined, a fitness value is generated for each cluster, using 
the distance function. This fitness value relates the distance of a single data 
pattern to a cluster's centroid. As such, the cluster with the lowest fitness value is 
the one whose centroid produced the least Euclidean Distance to the pattern.   
In order to accomplish this task, each pattern (p) from the data volume is 
examined and compared with each respective cluster centroid (c), such that the 
Euclidean Distance is given as:  
                   
 
   
 
 Where    = total number of elements in a data pattern 
    = the i
th
 pattern element  
    = the i
th
 centroid element 
        = distance from pattern p to centroid c  
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For this experiment, the fitness values generated for each pattern will focus on the 
continuous intrinsic attributes from the header's area of the network packets (i.e. 
TCP traffic properties). These attributes may be found in the table below.  
 
Feature Name Description 
Duration Length (number of seconds of the connection) 
Src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination 
Dst_bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source 
Wrong_fragment Number of "wrong" fragments 
Urgent Number of Urgent packets 
Table 11: Continuous intrinsic attributes of KDD and NSL-KDD datasets [56] 
 
By utilizing this information, it will allow the algorithm to focus on core traffic 
features that are most relevant in detecting attacks [73], as well as features that are 
usually available in network packets during encrypted communications. 
Furthermore, it will mitigate the reliance on higher-level features that are less 
relevant in detecting attacks [73] and that would not usually be available without 
additional data analysis.  
Once each fitness value is obtained, a pattern can be assigned to its best matching 
cluster, or the cluster that produced the lowest distance to the pattern. If the 
pattern was previously assigned to a cluster, then this assignment can also be 
updated with each iteration of the algorithm. Lastly, a reassignment counter is 
also incremented as each pattern is assigned or reassigned. This will aid in 
determining if the clustering has reached a convergence criteria. 
After each pattern has been assigned, each cluster centroid is recomputed as the 
new average, or mean, of the respective cluster's assigned patterns, or pattern set. 
In order to accomplish this task, each cluster's pattern set is traversed, retrieving 
each pattern element and summing the value together with the complementary 
centroid element. Once this process is complete, each centroid element is divided 
by the total number of assigned patterns plus one for the centroid, in order to find 
the mean pattern set for that cluster. An overview of this process may be found in 
the figure below. 
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Figure 19: Updating a Cluster Centroid 
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Finally, the convergence criteria is checked to see if the algorithm has reached its 
stopping point. If this criteria has been met, then the K-Means clustering has 
completed sorting the data and the intrusion detection module may begin its 
analysis. Otherwise, the second and third steps of the K-Means algorithm are 
repeated until the convergence criteria has been met.  
For this experiment, the convergence criteria will be set to be a minimum number 
of pattern reassignments across each clustering iteration. That value will be 1/8 of 
the total number of patterns. 
Finally, Java 1.7 multithreading will also be implemented across pattern 
assignment and centroid updates, in order to fully utilize available setup 
resources.  
 
3.3.3 Intrusion Detection Analysis 
The third area of the proposed IDS is the intrusion detection module. In this 
phase, the final clustering of the dataset is analyzed to determine if each set of 
cluster patterns is normal or potentially intrusive. As such, a non-intrusive 
approach is taken that is similar to Foroushani et al. [49], where each cluster 
centroid is analyzed for abnormal activity based on the TCP traffic properties of 
the related network data (i.e. intrinsic attributes). Foroushani et al. [49] also 
discussed how SSH packet sizes may be computed based on the protocol's 
specifications. From this information, the traffic properties for incoming and 
outgoing data bytes can be used to analyze each cluster group without relying on 
detailed payload information. An overview of this process may be found in the 
figure below. 
  
44 
 
 
Figure 20: Intrusion Detection Analysis using TCP Traffic Properties 
 
As each cluster centroid is examined, the traffic properties for source and 
destination bytes are retrieved. The descriptions for each of these properties may 
be found in the table below. Additional information may also be found in Table 3 
of the data set section. 
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Feature Name Description 
src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination 
dst_bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source 
Table 12: Data byte features of individual TCP connections [56] 
 
Using this information, the TCP traffic properties can be examined based on the 
expected network behavior. For example, in normal SSH access, the request, or 
input traffic size, is usually small while the reply, or output traffic size, is large. 
[49] Thus, a request with a large input size and a reply with a small output size 
can possibly be an intrusion. [49] Likewise, in typical scanning or probe attacks, 
the replies are smaller than regular contents, even if the requests are similar to 
normal traffic. [49] This is because that a server that is not vulnerable typically 
sends a response that includes a small message with an error status. [49] 
As such, each cluster centroid's traffic properties are examined for potential 
intrusions using this criterion. [49] For this experiment, a factor ratio will be 
computed in order to relate the value of source bytes to the value of destination 
bytes. If the source bytes feature is greater than the destination bytes property 
(e.g. buffer overflow attacks), the cluster is flagged as potentially intrusive. 
Likewise, if the factor ratio is small (e.g. scanning attacks), a flag will also be set. 
However, if the centroid passes each of the traffic property evaluations, then it is 
classified as normal. For this experiment, the minimum factorial ratio value was 
set to ten. 
The java implementation of the proposed system may be found in Appendix B. 
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3.4 Evaluation 
During this investigation, the precision and recall of the proposed system will be 
collected and analyzed with each dataset implementation, in order to evaluate the 
system's effectiveness in detecting intrusions. [60]  The precision is denoted as the 
fraction of retrieved instances that are relevant, or the fraction of potentially intrusive 
activities that are flagged with respect to the total number of alerts that are generated. 
Likewise, the recall is the fraction of relevant instances that are retrieved, or the fraction 
of potentially intrusive activities that are flagged with respect to the total number of 
intrusive activities that are present.  
The false rate of the system will also be analyzed in order to evaluate the efficiency of the 
non-intrusive approach against the only other known existing non-intrusive methodology. 
[1,49] The false rate is denoted as the summation of both the false positive rate and the 
false negative rate. [49] As such, it is composed of the total number of false alarms with 
respect to the total number of passive activities, as well as the total number of false 
negatives with respect to the total number of intrusive activities. An overview of each of 
the measurements may be found in the table below. 
 
Measurement Name Description 
Precision Fraction of flagged intrusive activities 
w.r.t. the total number of generated alerts. 
Recall Fraction of flagged intrusive activities 
w.r.t. the total number of intrusive activities present. 
False Positive Rate 
(FPR) 
Fraction of false alarms generated  
(e.g. flagged passive activities) 
w.r.t. the total number of passive activities.  
False Negative Rate 
(FNR) 
Fraction of false negatives generated  
(e.g. intrusive activities that were not flagged) 
w.r.t. the total number of intrusive activities. 
False Rate The summation of both the  
false positive rate and the false negative rate. 
Table 13: Measurement Descriptions 
 
The precision, recall, and false rate values will be collected for 25 trials on each dataset, 
along with relative time values. Once the trials have been completed, the average 
precision, recall, and false rate values will be calculated. The equations for each of these 
measurements may be found below. 
  
47 
 
 
       
 
   
 
             
 
   
 
                          
 
   
 
                         
 
   
 
                     
 
Where   = True Negatives 
   = False Negatives 
   = False Positives 
   = True Positives  
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Chapter 4: Results and Conclusions 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section displays the results from the 
evaluation of the proposed system. This includes measurement values and discussions as 
to what can be inferred from the retrieved data. The second and third sections discuss the 
final conclusions that can be drawn from the results, the limitations with the system, and 
the recommendations for future work. 
 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Precision 
The following table reflects the precision data collected for 25 trials on each 
dataset. 
 
Dataset Average Precision Standard Deviation 
KDD 100.00% ±0.00% 
NSL-KDD 100.00% ±0.00% 
Table 14: Average Precision Values for KDD and NSL-KDD Datasets 
   
By examining this information, it shows that the fraction of retrieved instances 
that are relevant remained at a high value across each trial evaluation. As such, 
passive activities were able to be classified appropriately across each trial, 
minimizing false positives from the data. 
 
4.1.2 Recall 
The following table reflects the recall data collected for 25 trials on each dataset. 
 
Dataset Average Recall Standard Deviation 
KDD 99.06% ±0.60% 
NSL-KDD 97.86% ±1.79% 
Table 15: Average Recall Values for KDD and NSL-KDD Datasets 
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By examining this information, it shows that the fraction of relevant instances that 
were retrieved remained at a high value across most of the trials. However, while 
many intrusive activities were able to be classified correctly as anomalies, there 
were still a fair amount of false negatives, or intrusive activities that were not 
flagged. 
 
4.1.3 False Rate 
The following table reflects the false rate data collected for 25 trials on each 
dataset. 
 
Dataset Average False Rate Standard Deviation 
KDD 0.94% ±0.601% 
NSL-KDD 2.14% ±1.788 % 
Table 16: Average False Rate Values for KDD and NSL-KDD Datasets 
 
By examining this information, it shows that both the false positive rate and the 
false negative rate were able to remain within a small value range across each set 
of trials. As such, many of the passive activities and intrusive activities were able 
to be classified appropriately, containing only a small quantity of passive 
activities that were flagged or intrusive activities that were not flagged.  
 
4.1.4 Time 
The following table reflects the time data collected for 25 trials on each dataset. 
 
Dataset Average Time  
(in seconds) 
Standard Deviation 
(in milliseconds) 
Average  
# of Loops 
KDD 00:27:618 ±00:00:189 3 
NSL-KDD 00:01:191 ±00:00:017 3 
Table 17: Average Time Values for KDD and NSL-KDD Datasets 
 
By examining this information, it shows that average time required to perform 
each trial was within consistent time frames with respect to the average number of 
iterations used by the K-Means clustering algorithm. 
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4.1.5 Dataset Comparison 
The following table shows the relationship of the number of records to processing 
time for each dataset implementation. 
 
Dataset Total Records SSH Records Average Time 
KDD 4,898,431 1,075 00:27:618 seconds 
NSL-KDD 125,973 311 00:01:191 seconds 
Table 18: Number of Records and Processing Time 
 
The average results for each dataset are summarized in the table below. The 
confusion matrix for each dataset is also located below the summary table. 
 
 
KDD NSL-KDD 
Average Standard Deviation Average Standard Deviation 
Avg Precision 100.00% ±0.00% 100.00% ±0.00% 
Avg Recall 99.06% ±0.60% 97.86% ±1.79% 
Avg False Rate 0.94% ±0.601% 2.14% ±1.788 % 
Avg Time 00:27:618 ±00:00:189 00:01:191 ±00:00:017 
Table 19: Dataset Comparison Summary 
 
KDD Flagged Not Flagged 
Intrusive 1054 14 
Passive 0 7 
Table 20: Confusion Matrix for KDD 
 
NSL-KDD Flagged Not Flagged 
Intrusive 295 11 
Passive 0 5 
Table 21: Confusion Matrix for NSL-KDD 
 
4.1.6 Non-Intrusive Analysis Comparison 
The average false rate results from each non-intrusive methodology are 
summarized in the table below. 
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Proposed System 
Foroushani
[49]
 
KDD NSL 
Avg False Rate 0.94% 2.14% 15% 
Table 22: Non-Intrusive Analysis Comparison Summary 
 
By examining this information, it shows that the average false rate for the 
proposed non-intrusive approach performed well in comparison to the only other 
known existing non-intrusive methodology. 
 
4.2 Conclusions 
In this paper, a non-intrusive approach was proposed to detect network intrusions across 
encrypted accesses using a K-Means clustering model and TCP traffic properties. While 
many Intrusion Detection Systems will typically utilize a signature-based or anomaly-
based approach to analyze in-the-clear network traffic, the growing use of encrypted 
communications continues to deny the use of payload-related data. This non-intrusive 
methodology provides a potential solution to mitigate these issues, by complying with 
four goals required for next-generation intrusion detection systems. [1] 
 
This approach supports a behavior-based analysis, in contrast to the reliance on databases 
of attack signatures. Thus, this approach should provide support for the growing use of 
encrypted communications. An unsupervised K-Means clustering algorithm was used so 
that there is no learning phase. There was thus no evaluation of packet payload-related 
data. This also ensures the confidentiality of the packet information and reduces the 
computational complexity of the evaluation. This work used a non-intrusive approach 
similar to Foroushani et. al. [49]. This uses TCP traffic properties for evaluation of the 
data. Lastly, this approach supports the implementation of a network-centric design. 
There was thus no reliance on host-based implementation data for evaluation (e.g. log 
files). The KDD '99 and NSL-KDD evaluation datasets were used to test this new 
approach. 
 
This paper analyzes a new non-intrusive approach that is able to detect many intrusions in 
the used datasets. Furthermore, the average false detection rate of the tested system 
showed greatly improved results in comparison to other non-intrusive methodologies. 
Therefore, based on the tables in chapter 4, the proposed system operated effectively in 
detecting many of the network intrusions for these datasets while maintaining the 
encrypted confidentiality of the packet information. 
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4.3 Future Work 
Now that the investigation has concluded, there are some extensions of this work.  
First, implement an enhanced clustering algorithm that shortens the time to group the 
data. While the K-Means clustering provides a methodology to sort information into 
similar cluster groups, it has inherent drawbacks, including the ability to fall into a local 
optimum instead of a global optimum as well as potentially creating an exponential 
running-time as the dataset information continues to scale in size. [74] With this route, 
there are a few interesting areas of study analyzing clustering algorithms with real-time 
data. [61-63]  
Second, a different standardized dataset of traffic information should be tested. This 
should include a more balanced distribution of data between both passive and intrusive 
activities and a more diverse set of attacks. The KDD and NSL-KDD datasets are useful 
in analyzing the system against basic network-related data. However, each of the datasets 
used herein suffer from limitations. These include a strong correlation towards intrusive 
network behaviors and limited types of attack types for encrypted service protocols (e.g. 
SSH). Examples of these features may be seen in Table 9 above. 
Third, the use of additional traffic properties can also be examined. [49] 
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Chapter 6: Appendices 
Appendix A: Vocabulary Index 
 
Title Definition 
Anomalies  
(i.e. Outliers) 
Patterns in data that do not conform to a well-defined notion of normal 
behavior. [30]  
For example, a set of data points that is relatively different from the rest 
of the analyzed data set may be considered an anomaly.  
Anomaly Detection  
(i.e. Heuristic-based) 
Classifies traffic as normal or anomalous based on a set of heuristics, or 
rules. This technique attempts to detect misuse by monitoring a 
system’s activities for any behavior that deviates from the norm. [16] 
Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) 
A protocol used in telecommunications in order to map a network layer 
address (i.e. IP Address) into a link layer address (i.e. MAC address). 
Attack Toolkit A hacker kit that exploits client-side vulnerabilities in order to execute 
arbitrary code. [32] 
Botnets 
(i.e. Bot Networks) 
A network of compromised computers, known as drones or zombies, 
that are used by cyber criminals in order to transmit spam messages, 
spread malware, and/or for other criminal activities. [32] 
Clustering Criterion The mathematical formulation of the inductive principle. This criterion is 
used to differentiate various clustering models given the same data set. 
[35] 
Clustering Model A structure used to represent a cluster. [35] 
Cyberespionage 
(i.e. Cyber Espionage or  
The act or practice of obtaining confidential information, stored in 
digital formats on computers or IT networks, without the permission of 
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Cyber Spying) the holder through the use of cracking techniques or malicious software. 
[51]  
Dynamic Clustering 
Algorithm 
This algorithm formulates the clustering problem in terms of the 
Maximum-Likelihood Estimation framework and allows the use of  
representations other than the centroid for each cluster. [36] 
False Positive 
(i.e. Type I Error) 
A false positive is a sequence of innocuous events that an IDS 
erroneously classifies as intrusive [2][15].  
False Positive Rate 
(i.e. False Alarm Rate) 
The expectancy of producing a false positive. 
False Negative  
(i.e. Type II Error) 
A false negative is sequence of unwanted traffic or intrusion attempts 
that an IDS fails to detect or report. [2][15] 
False Negative Rate The expectancy of producing a false negative. 
Host-based The data, or set of packets, to and from a single host is used to detect 
signs of an intrusion. [16] 
Inductive Principle 
(i.e. Induction Principle) 
A mathematical formalization for the definition of a cluster. This 
principle is used to make explicit a clustering criterion, in order to select 
a “best fit” structure given a set of data [35] 
Intrusion Detection Intrusion Detection the process of monitoring a network or system for 
potential signs of malicious activities or policy violations.  
Intrusion Detection System 
(i.e. IDS) 
An intrusion detection system is a device that attempts to detect an 
intrusion into a network or system using observed information and/or 
audit data. It can be a piece of installed software or a physical 
component that monitors traffic in order to detect unwanted activities, 
events, and/or policy violations. [2] 
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Intrusion Prevention System 
(i.e. IPS) 
 An intrusion prevention system is a device that attempts to both detect 
and prevent an intrusion. [2]  
Misuse Detection  
(i.e. Signature-based) 
Classifies based on patterns or signatures. This detection technique can 
only detect an intrusion for which a signature already exists. [16] 
Network-based The data from a network is scrutinized against a database or model in 
order to flag packets that are potentially malicious. Audit data from one 
or multiple hosts may also be incorporated to detect signs of an 
intrusion. [16] 
Particle Swarm Optimization 
Algorithm  
(i.e. PSOA) 
An algorithm from the field of swarm intelligence. This algorithm was 
first introduced as a substitute for a genetic algorithm (i.e. GA). It 
operates on the basis that consecutive actions of respective individuals 
are influenced by their own movements and those of their companions. 
[38] 
Secure Sockets Layer  
(i.e. SSL)  
 A commonly-used protocol for managing the security of a message 
transmission between a server and a client. [68-69] It has been 
succeeded by Transport Layer Security (TLS), which is based on SSL. [70] 
Signature  
(i.e. Digital Fingerprint;  
Digital Footprint) 
Recorded evidence of a system intrusion (i.e. digital footprint). 
For example, the number of failed logins or the unauthorized execution 
of software may be an example of a signature. [52] 
Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition Systems 
(i.e. SCADA) 
A type of industrial control system used for gathering and analyzing real-
time data or information. Usually, they have been used to monitor and 
control industry equipment or plant infrastructures. (e.g. 
telecommunications, water and waste control, energy, oil, etc) [53] 
Transmission Control One of the main protocols in TCP/IP networks. TCP enables two hosts to 
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Protocol 
(i.e. TCP) 
establish a connection and exchange streams of data. It also provides a 
guarantee for the delivery of the data as well as maintaining the order in 
which the data packets were sent. [72] 
Transport Layer Security  
(i.e. TLS) 
A protocol that provides data encryption and authentication between 
applications and servers. [64] It is based on Netscape's SSL 3.0 protocol 
[65-66], and is considered to be the successor of SSL. [67] While the 
differences between TLS and SSL are minor and very technical [67], they 
are not interoperable.[65-66] 
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities A vulnerability that is unknown to others, undisclosed to the software 
developer, or for which no security fix is available. [32] 
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Appendix B: Java Implementation 
Appendix B.1: K-Means Clustering Algorithm 
/* 
 * Name: Luis C. Armendariz 
 * Program Name: K-Means Clustering Algorithm 
 * Advisor: Dr. Roy S. Nutter 
 * Date: 10/25/2013 
 * Program Description: Parses KDD & NSL-KDD datasets from input files and performs K-Means 
Clustering on SSH data 
*/ 
 
import java.util.Scanner;                   //Get scanner to parse input file into pieces 
import java.io.FileReader;                  //Get file reader to read input file as whole 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;       //Error Handling 
import java.util.Arrays;                    //Gets static methods for Arrays 
import java.util.ArrayList;                 //Import ArrayList 
import java.util.Random;                    //Import Random for random # generator 
import java.util.concurrent.Executors; 
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService; 
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit; 
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger; 
import java.math.BigDecimal;                //Allows rounding of double type values 
 
public class kMeans 
{ 
  static Scanner console = new Scanner(System.in);   //Initialize scanner for reading user input 
   
  public static void main(String[] args) throws FileNotFoundException 
  { 
    /*********************************************** 
      ************* DATA INITIALIZATION ************ 
      **********************************************/ 
     
    //Initialize run time 
    long startTime = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
    String runTime = ""; 
     
    //Initialize variables 
    String inFileName = "KDDTrain+";   //"kddcup.data"; //KDDTrain+";   //Input file name (w/o .txt) 
    String delimiter = "\\,";          //Delimiter token (comma) 
    String connType = "ssh";           //Type of connection to examine 
    boolean normCheck = true;          //Check to normalize input data from dataset 
     
    int[] fitPattern;                  //Pattern for continuous data locations 
    int labelDistance;                 //Pattern label distance to factor during fitness 
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    String inLine = "";                //Input line of data  
    String normLine = "";              //Input line of normalized data 
    ArrayList<String> volume;          //Volume of data values (Array List of Strings) 
    ArrayList<String> volumeNorm;      //Volume of normalized data values 
    ArrayList<String> volumeOrig;      //Volume of original data values 
    int totalPatterns = 0;             //Total # of Patterns 
     
    int k = 0;                         //Number of cluster centers (i.e. centroids) 
    String randomPattern = "";         //Random pattern 
    ArrayList<Cluster> clusterList;    //List of clusters 
    ArrayList<Integer> patternGuesses; //List of pattern selections 
    Random generator;                  //Random # generator 
    int randomNum;                     //Random Number 
     
    //Initialize Thread Pool Manager 
    ExecutorService es = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); 
     
    int[] clusterAssign;               //Keyed Array of Pattern to Cluster assignments [Ex: Pattern1=>Cluster5] 
    AtomicInteger clusterReassigns;    //Number of cluster reassignments 
    int clusterLoops = 0;              //Number of clustering loops 
     
     
    //Get input file 
    Scanner inFile = new Scanner (new FileReader (inFileName + ".txt"));      //Get input file 
     
    //Set fitness pattern & label distance (for continous data analysis) 
    switch(inFileName) 
    { 
      //NSL-KDD 
      case "KDDTrain+": 
        //fitPattern = new 
int[]{0,4,5,7,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40};  
//All continuous elements 
        fitPattern = new int[]{0,4,5,7,8};  //Only continuous TCP elements 
        labelDistance = 2; 
        break; 
      //KDD 
      case "kddcup.data": 
        //fitPattern = new 
int[]{0,4,5,7,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40};  
//All continuous elements 
        fitPattern = new int[]{0,4,5,7,8}; 
        labelDistance = 1; 
        break; 
      case "kddcup.data_10_percent": 
        //fitPattern = new 
int[]{0,4,5,7,8,9,10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40}; 
        fitPattern = new int[]{0,4,5,7,8}; 
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        labelDistance = 1; 
        break; 
      default: 
        fitPattern = new int[0]; 
        labelDistance = 1; 
        break; 
    } 
     
     
    //Traverse input file for SSH data 
    //volume = new ArrayList<String>(); 
    volumeNorm = new ArrayList<String>(); 
    volumeOrig = new ArrayList<String>(); 
    while (inFile.hasNext()) 
    {  
      //Get next line of data 
      inLine = inFile.nextLine(); 
       
      //Check if line contains SSH data 
      if(inLine.toLowerCase().contains(connType.toLowerCase())) 
      { 
        //Check to normalize the data 
        if(normCheck) 
        { 
          //Step C: If found, Normalize the data using Log Normalization 
          normLine = logNormalize(inLine, delimiter, fitPattern); 
          //System.out.println("In:   " + inLine); 
          //System.out.println("Norm: " + normLine); 
         
          //Add normalized SSH data to end of normalized volume 
          volumeNorm.add(normLine); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
          //Add original SSH data to end of volume 
          volumeOrig.add(inLine); 
        } 
      } 
    } 
     
    //Set volume for clustering (check for normalization) 
    if(normCheck) 
    { 
      volume = volumeNorm; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      volume = volumeOrig; 
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    } 
     
    //Set total number of patterns 
    totalPatterns = volume.size(); 
     
     
     
     
    /************************************************* 
     *************** K-Means Clustering ************** 
     *************************************************/ 
     
    /************************************************* 
     ******************** STEP #1 ******************** 
     *************************************************/ 
    /* Instructions 
     * ------------ 
     * Choose k cluster centers to coincide with k  
     * randomly-chosen patterns or k randomly defined  
     * points inside the hyper volume containing the  
     * pattern set 
     */  
     
     
    //Set value of k 
    k = (int) Math.sqrt(totalPatterns/2);   //Rule of Thumb by Mardia et al.[59] 
     
    //Setup list variables and random number generator 
    clusterList = new ArrayList<Cluster>(); 
    patternGuesses = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
    generator = new Random(); 
     
    //Choose k random patterns from volume to make k cluster centers 
    for(int i=0; i < k; i++) 
    { 
      //Get a pattern from volume 
      try  
      { 
        //Get a random unchosen pattern location 
        do 
        { 
          //Generate a "random" number from 0 to totalPatterns-1 
          randomNum = generator.nextInt(totalPatterns); 
         
          //Check if number was already chosen  (prevents selecting the same patterns as centroids) 
        }while(patternGuesses.contains(randomNum)); 
         
        //Add pattern location to list 
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        patternGuesses.add(randomNum); 
         
        //Get pattern 
        randomPattern = volume.get(randomNum);  
      } 
      catch(IndexOutOfBoundsException err) 
      { 
        System.err.println("An error occurred: " + err.getMessage()); 
      } 
       
      //Create cluster & assign centroid (Split pattern into element pieces) 
      Cluster cluster = new Cluster(randomPattern.split(delimiter), labelDistance, fitPattern); 
       
      //Add cluster to Cluster ArrayList 
      clusterList.add(cluster); 
    } 
     
     
    /***** Prepare for Looping *****/ 
    //Initialize cluster assignment array 
    clusterAssign = new int[totalPatterns]; 
     
     
     
     
    //Begin K-Means Clustering Loop 
    do 
    { 
      /************************************************* 
       ******************** STEP #2 ******************** 
       *************************************************/ 
      /* Instructions 
       * ------------ 
       * Assign each pattern to closest cluster center 
       */ 
     
      //Reset cluster reassignment count 
      clusterReassigns = new AtomicInteger(0); 
       
      //Initialize Thread Pool Manager (for RunnableCluster Threads) 
      es = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); 
       
      //Loop through volume 
      for(int i=0; i < totalPatterns; i++) 
      { 
        //Create RunnableCluster Object 
        RunnableCluster threadAssign = new RunnableCluster(i, volume, clusterList, clusterAssign, 
clusterLoops, clusterReassigns, delimiter); 
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        //Execute thread to assign pattern to closest cluster centroid 
        es.execute(threadAssign); 
      } 
       
      //Shutdown thread pool & finish all queued threads 
      shutdownAndAwaitTermination(es); 
       
       
      //System.out.println("2 Done"); 
       
      /************************************************* 
        ******************** STEP #3 ******************** 
        *************************************************/ 
      /* Instructions 
       * ------------ 
       * Recompute the cluster centers  
       * using the current cluster memberships 
       */ 
     
      //Initialize Thread Pool Manager (for RunnableCentroid Threads) 
      es = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); 
       
      //Loop through cluster list 
      for(int i=0, j=clusterList.size(); i < j; i++) 
      { 
        //Create RunnableCentroid Object 
        RunnableCentroid threadUpdate = new RunnableCentroid(clusterList.get(i), volume, delimiter); 
         
        //Execute thread to recompute cluster centroid 
        es.execute(threadUpdate); 
      } 
       
      //Shutdown thread pool & finish all queued threads 
      shutdownAndAwaitTermination(es); 
       
       
      //System.out.println("3 Done"); 
       
      /************************************************* 
        ******************** STEP #4 ******************** 
        *************************************************/ 
      /* Instructions 
       * ------------ 
       * If a convergence criterion is not met, go to step 2 
       *  
       * Typical convergence criteria are:  
       * * no (or minimal) reassignment of patterns to new cluster centers,  
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       * * or minimal decrease in squared error  
       */ 
       
      clusterLoops = clusterLoops + 1;  
       
      //System.out.println("4 Done = Reassigns: " + clusterReassigns.get() + " Ratio: " + (totalPatterns/16)); 
       
    }while(clusterReassigns.get() > (totalPatterns/8)); 
     
     
     
     
    /************************************************* 
     ***************** IDS Analysis ****************** 
     *************************************************/ 
    /* Instructions 
     * ------------ 
     * Uses Traffic Properties to Identify Centroids with Attack Traffic (High Level Analysis) 
     *  
     * Future Work: 
     * Scan each cluster pattern and make best attempts to identify individual attacks (Deep Level 
Analysis) 
     */ 
     
    //Initialize array to hold analysis results 
    String[] ids_results = new String[clusterList.size()]; 
     
    //Loop through cluster list 
    for(int i=0, j=clusterList.size(); i < j; i++) 
    { 
      //Analyze each cluster for probability of attacks 
      ids_results[i] = ids_analyze(clusterList.get(i), normCheck); 
    } 
     
     
     
     
    /*********************************************** 
      *************** ENDING CLEAN UP ************** 
      **********************************************/ 
     
    //Calculate run time 
    runTime = getRunTime(startTime); 
     
    //Completion message 
    System.out.println("The program has completed execution."); 
    System.out.println(); 
    System.out.println("File Name: " + inFileName); 
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    System.out.println("Total Run Time: " + runTime); 
    System.out.println("Total Patterns: " + totalPatterns); 
    System.out.println("Total Loops: " + clusterLoops); 
    System.out.println("K: " + k); 
    System.out.println(); 
     
    //printClusterListPatterns(clusterList); 
    //System.out.println(); 
    printClusterListPatternsWithLabelsAsSummary(clusterList,volume,delimiter); 
    System.out.println(); 
    //printClusterListCentroids(clusterList); 
    //System.out.println(); 
    printIDSAnalysis(ids_results); 
     
  }//end main 
   
   
   
   
   
  /********************************************* 
    *************** Function List ************** 
    ********************************************/ 
   
  private static String getRunTime(long sTime) 
  { 
    //Calculate run time 
    long endTime   = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
    long totalTime = endTime - sTime; 
    String runTime = millisecondsToStr(totalTime); 
     
    return runTime; 
  }//end getRunTime 
   
  private static String ids_analyze(Cluster cluster, boolean normCheck) 
  { 
    String retStr = "";                              //return value 
     
    //Get cluster centroid 
    String[] centroid = cluster.getCentroid(); 
     
    //System.out.print("Centroid: "); 
    //cluster.printCentroid(); 
    //System.out.println(); 
     
    //Check if cluster is empty 
    if(cluster.getPatternListSize() == 0) 
    { 
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      retStr =  "(empty)"; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      /* Analyze cluster centroid based on traffic properties */ 
      //Analyze Flow Sizes [Based on Foroushani et al.[49] & NSL/KDD Datasets] 
      double src_size_dec = Double.valueOf(centroid[4]);  //number of data bytes from source to 
destination 
      double dst_size_dec = Double.valueOf(centroid[5]);  //number of data bytes from destination to 
source 
      double factor = 0;                              //factor ratio of source to dest. bytes 
       
      //Check for log normalization 
      if(normCheck) 
      { 
        //Denormalize values 
        src_size_dec = (Math.ceil(Math.pow(10,src_size_dec)) - 1); 
        dst_size_dec = (Math.ceil(Math.pow(10,src_size_dec)) - 1); 
      } 
       
      //Round values up to nearest whole number 
      float src_size = (float)Math.ceil(src_size_dec); 
      float dst_size = (float)Math.ceil(dst_size_dec); 
       
      //Get factor value 
      if((src_size != 0)) 
      { 
        factor = dst_size / src_size; 
        //System.out.println("Src Size: " + src_size + " Dst Size: " + dst_size + " Factor: " + factor); 
      } 
       
      //If small request 
      if(src_size <= dst_size) 
      { 
        //With big response, classify Normal 
        if(factor > 10) 
        { 
          retStr = "Normal"; 
          //System.out.println(); 
          //cluster.printPatternListExpanded(volume, delimiter); 
          //System.out.println(); 
        } 
         
        //With small response, classify Anomalous (e.g. Scanning Attack (Probe)) 
        else 
        { 
          retStr = "Anomalous"; 
        } 
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      } 
       
      //If big request with smaller response, classify Anomalous (e.g. Buffer Overflow) 
      else  
      { 
        retStr = "Anomalous"; 
      } 
    } 
    return retStr; 
  }//end ids_analyze 
   
  private static boolean isNumeric(String str) 
  { 
    return str.matches("-?\\d+(\\.\\d+)?");  //match a number (latin digits) with optional '-' and decimal. 
  }//end isNumeric [Open Source] 
   
  public static String logNormalize(String inLine, String delimiter, int[] fitPattern) 
  { 
    //Declare variables 
    String inPiece = ""; 
    String normLine = ""; 
     
    //Split input line into pieces 
    String[] inLinePieces = inLine.split(delimiter); 
     
    //For each fitPattern value 
    for(int i=0,j=fitPattern.length; i < j; i++) 
    { 
      //Get corresponding input line piece 
      inPiece = inLinePieces[fitPattern[i]]; 
       
      //Check if piece is continuous (i.e. numeric) 
      if(isNumeric(inPiece)) 
      { 
        //If numeric, convert from string to numeric (Xij) 
        double inData = Double.valueOf(inPiece); 
           
        //Apply log normalization formula (X'ij = log(1 + Xij)) 
        inData = Math.log10(1 + inData); 
         
        //Round value to 2 decimal places 
        inData = round(inData, 2, BigDecimal.ROUND_HALF_UP); 
         
        //Store new value in piece location 
        inPiece = String.valueOf(inData); 
         
        //Store normalized piece back in array of pieces 
        inLinePieces[fitPattern[i]] = inPiece; 
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      } 
    } 
     
    //Create string from array of strings 
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
 
    for(String s: inLinePieces)  
    { 
      sb.append(s).append(','); 
    } 
 
    sb.deleteCharAt(sb.length()-1); //delete last comma 
     
    normLine = sb.toString(); 
     
    //Return normalized input line as complete string 
    return normLine; 
  }//end logNormalize 
   
   
  public static String millisecondsToStr(long milliseconds)  
  { 
    // TIP: to find current time in milliseconds, use: 
    // var  current_time_milliseconds = new Date().getTime(); 
 
    // This function does not deal with leap years, however, 
    // it should not be an issue because the output is approximated 
     
    String retStr = ""; 
    double temp; 
     
    //Convert ms to seconds (if applicable) 
    if ((milliseconds / 1000) != 0) 
    { 
      temp = milliseconds / 1000; 
     
      //Get years 
      double years = Math.floor(temp / 31536000); 
      if (years != 0)  
      { 
        temp %= 31536000; 
        retStr += years + " Year" + numberEnding(years) + " "; 
      } 
       
      //Get days 
      double days = Math.floor(temp / 86400); 
      if (days != 0)  
      { 
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        temp %= 86400; 
        retStr += days + " Day" + numberEnding(days) + " "; 
      } 
       
      //Get hours 
      double hours = Math.floor(temp / 3600); 
      if (hours != 0)  
      { 
        temp %= 3600; 
        retStr += hours + " hr" + numberEnding(hours) + " "; 
      } 
       
      //Get minutes 
      double minutes = Math.floor(temp / 60); 
      if (minutes != 0)  
      { 
        temp %= 60; 
        retStr += minutes + " min" + numberEnding(minutes) + " "; 
      } 
       
      //Get seconds 
      double seconds = temp; 
      if (seconds != 0)  
      { 
        retStr += seconds + " sec" + numberEnding(seconds) + " "; 
      } 
       
      //Get milliseconds 
      double milliSec = milliseconds % 1000; 
      if (milliSec != 0) 
      { 
        retStr += milliSec + " ms "; 
      } 
    } 
    else 
    { 
        retStr += milliseconds + " ms"; 
    } 
     
    return retStr; 
  }//end millisecondsToStr [Open Source] 
   
  private static String numberEnding(double numb)  
  {  
    String retVal; 
         
    if(numb > 1) 
    { 
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      retVal = "s"; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      retVal = ""; 
    } 
      
    return retVal; 
  }//end numberEnding 
   
  private static void printClusterAssigns(int[] clusterAssignments) 
  { 
    for(int r=0,s=clusterAssignments.length; r < s; r++) 
    { 
      System.out.print(r + "->" + clusterAssignments[r] + " "); 
    } 
    System.out.println(); 
  }//end printClusterAssigns 
   
  private static void printClusterListCentroids(ArrayList<Cluster> clusterL) 
  { 
    for(int i=0,j=clusterL.size(); i < j; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.println(i + " " + Arrays.toString(clusterL.get(i).getCentroid())); 
    } 
  }//end printClusterListCentroids 
   
  private static void printClusterListPatterns(ArrayList<Cluster> clusterL) 
  { 
    for(int i=0,j=clusterL.size(); i < j; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.print("Cluster " + i + ": "); 
      clusterL.get(i).printPatternList(); 
    } 
  }//end printClusterListPatterns 
   
  private static void printClusterListPatternsWithLabels(ArrayList<Cluster> clusterL, ArrayList<String> 
volume, String delimiter) 
  { 
    for(int i=0,j=clusterL.size(); i < j; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.print("Cluster " + i + ": "); 
      clusterL.get(i).printPatternListWithLabels(volume, delimiter); 
    } 
  }//end printClusterListPatternsWithLabels 
   
  private static void printClusterListPatternsWithLabelsAsSummary(ArrayList<Cluster> clusterL, 
ArrayList<String> volume, String delimiter) 
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  { 
    for(int i=0,j=clusterL.size(); i < j; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.print("Cluster " + i + ": "); 
      clusterL.get(i).printPatternListWithLabelsAsSummary(volume, delimiter); 
    } 
  }//end printClusterListPatternsWithLabelsAsSummary 
   
  private static void printIDSAnalysis(String[] ids_results) 
  { 
    for(int i=0,j=ids_results.length; i < j; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.println("Cluster " + i + ": " + ids_results[i]); 
    } 
  }//end printIDSAnalysis 
   
  public static double round(double unrounded, int precision, int roundingMode) 
  { 
    BigDecimal bd = new BigDecimal(unrounded); 
    BigDecimal rounded = bd.setScale(precision, roundingMode); 
    return rounded.doubleValue(); 
  }//end round [Open Source] 
   
  private static void shutdownAndAwaitTermination(ExecutorService pool) 
  { 
    //Disable new tasks from being submitted & finish all existing threads in queue 
    pool.shutdown(); 
     
    try 
    { 
      //Wait a while for existing tasks to terminate 
      if(!pool.awaitTermination(1, TimeUnit.MINUTES)) 
      { 
        pool.shutdownNow();  //Cancel currently executing tasks 
         
        //Wait a while for tasks to respond to being cancelled 
        if(!pool.awaitTermination(1, TimeUnit.MINUTES)) 
        { 
          System.err.println("Pool did not terminate"); 
        } 
      } 
    } 
    catch (InterruptedException ie) 
    { 
      System.err.println("An error occurred: " + ie.getMessage()); 
       
      // (Re-)Cancel if current thread also interrupted 
      pool.shutdownNow(); 
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      //Preserve interrupt status 
      Thread.currentThread().interrupt(); 
    } 
  }//end shutdownAndAwaitTermination [Open Source] 
}//end kMeans 
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Appendix B.2: K-Means Cluster class 
/* 
 * Name: Luis C. Armendariz 
 * Program Name: Cluster 
 * Advisor: Dr. Roy S. Nutter 
 * Date: 10/29/2013 
 * Program Description: Creates a Cluster class for the K-Means Algorithm 
*/ 
 
import java.util.ArrayList;                 //Import ArrayList 
import java.util.Iterator;                  //Allows traversal of an ArrayList 
import java.util.Map;                       //Get methods for Map 
import java.util.HashMap;                   //Import HashMap 
 
public class Cluster 
{ 
  private ArrayList<Integer> patternList;  //List of pattern locations 
  private String[] centroid;               //Cluster center 
  private final int labelDistance;         //Pattern label distance for fitness 
  private final int[] fitPattern;          //Pattern for continuous data locations 
  private Object lock1 = new Object();     //Lock 1 for synchronization with threads 
  private Object lock2 = new Object();     //Lock 2 for synchronization with threads 
  private Object lock3 = new Object();     //Lock 3 for synchronization with threads 
   
  /********************/ 
  /*** Constructors ***/ 
  /********************/ 
  public Cluster(int totalElements, int labelDistance, int[] fitPattern) 
  { 
    this.patternList = new ArrayList<Integer>();           
    this.centroid = new String[totalElements];             
    this.labelDistance = labelDistance; 
    this.fitPattern = fitPattern; 
  }//end Cluster 
   
  public Cluster(String[] inCentroid, int labelDistance, int[] fitPattern) 
  { 
    this.patternList = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
    this.centroid = inCentroid; 
    this.labelDistance = labelDistance; 
    this.fitPattern = fitPattern; 
  }//end Cluster(String) 
   
   
   
  /********************/ 
  /**** Accessors *****/ 
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  /********************/ 
  public String[] getCentroid() 
  { 
    return centroid; 
  }//end getCentroid 
   
  public double getFitness(String[] pattern) 
  { 
    //Initialize variables 
    double fitValue = 0; 
    double sumSquare = 0.0; 
     
    //Euclidean Distance Function = d(p,q) = sqrt(sumFromI=1ToN((qi - pi)^2)) 
     
    //Check for fitness pattern 
    if(fitPattern.length > 0) 
    { 
      //For length of fitness pattern, get Continuous Data elements 
      for(int i=0,j=fitPattern.length; i < j; i++) 
      { 
        //Get an element 
        String strData = pattern[fitPattern[i]]; 
         
        //Check if element is numerical value 
        if(isNumeric(strData)) 
        { 
          //If numeric, convert from string to numeric (q) 
          double inData = Double.valueOf(strData); 
           
          //Take the difference between the Mean element (q-p) 
          double diff = inData - Double.valueOf(centroid[fitPattern[i]]); 
           
          //Square the difference (q-p)^2 
          double square = Math.pow(diff,2); 
           
          //Add value to total sum of squares E(qi-pi)^2 
          sumSquare = sumSquare + square; 
        } 
      } 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      //For length of String array, get only Numerics 
      for(int i=0,j=pattern.length - labelDistance; i < j; i++)   //Pattern.length-2 is to avoid factoring in the 
attack labels as part of fitness value 
      { 
        //Get an element 
        String strData = pattern[i]; 
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        //Check if element is numerical value 
        if(isNumeric(strData)) 
        { 
          //If numeric, convert from string to numeric (q) 
          double inData = Double.valueOf(strData); 
           
          //Take the difference between the Mean element (q-p) 
          double diff = inData - Double.valueOf(centroid[i]); 
           
          //Square the difference (q-p)^2 
          double square = Math.pow(diff,2); 
           
          //Add value to total sum of squares E(qi-pi)^2 
          sumSquare = sumSquare + square; 
        } 
      } 
    } 
     
    //Take square root of sum of squares to find Euclidean Distance 
    fitValue = Math.sqrt(sumSquare); 
     
    return fitValue; 
  }//end getFitness 
   
  public int[] getFitPattern() 
  { 
    return fitPattern; 
  }//end getFitPattern 
   
  public int getLabelDistance() 
  { 
    return labelDistance; 
  }//end getLabelDistance 
   
  public Integer getPattern(int location) 
  { 
    Integer outPattern = 0; 
     
    try  
    { 
      outPattern = patternList.get(location); 
    } 
    catch(IndexOutOfBoundsException err) 
    { 
      System.out.println("An error occurred: " + err.getMessage()); 
    } 
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    return outPattern; 
  }//end getPattern 
   
  public ArrayList<Integer> getPatternList() 
  { 
    return patternList; 
  }//end getPatternList 
   
  public int getPatternListSize() 
  { 
    return patternList.size(); 
  }//end getPatternListSize 
   
   
   
  /********************/ 
  /***** Mutators *****/ 
  /********************/ 
  public void addPattern(Integer pattern) 
  { 
    synchronized(lock1)  
    { 
      patternList.add(pattern); 
    } 
  }//end addPattern 
   
  public void removePattern(Integer pattern) 
  { 
    synchronized(lock2) 
    { 
      patternList.remove(pattern);  //Remove Integer Object of unique pattern location w.r.t. volume 
    } 
  }//end removePattern 
   
  public void setPattern(Integer pattern, int location) 
  { 
    synchronized(lock3) 
    { 
      patternList.set(location, pattern); 
    } 
  }//end setPattern 
   
   
   
  /********************/ 
  /**** Executors *****/ 
  /********************/ 
  public void printCentroid() 
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  { 
    for(int i=0,j=centroid.length; i < j ; i++) 
    { 
      System.out.print(centroid[i]); 
       
      if((i+1) != j) 
      { 
        System.out.print(","); 
      }//end if 
    }//end for 
  }//end printCentroid 
   
  public void printPatternList() 
  { 
    Iterator<Integer> it = patternList.iterator();    //Attach patternList to iterator for traversal 
     
    if(it.hasNext()) 
    { 
      while(it.hasNext())  
      { 
        System.out.print(it.next() + " " ); 
      } 
      System.out.println(); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      System.out.println("(empty)"); 
    } 
  }//end printPatternList 
   
  public void printPatternListExpanded(ArrayList<String> volume, String delimiter) 
  { 
    Iterator<Integer> it = patternList.iterator();    //Attach patternList to iterator for traversal 
     
    //Check for patterns 
    if(it.hasNext()) 
    { 
      //Loop through patterns 
      while(it.hasNext())  
      { 
        //Get a pattern from volume 
        String[] tempPat = volume.get(it.next()).split(delimiter); 
         
        //Print entire pattern 
        /* 
        for(int i=0,j=tempPat.length; i < j; i++) 
        { 
          System.out.print(tempPat[i]); 
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          if((i+1) != j) 
          { 
            System.out.print(","); 
          } 
        } 
        System.out.println(); 
        */ 
         
        //Print Src_bytes and Dst_bytes elements of pattern 
        System.out.println(tempPat[4] + "," + tempPat[5]); 
      } 
      System.out.println(); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      System.out.println("(empty)"); 
    } 
  }//end printPatternListExpanded 
   
  public void printPatternListWithLabels(ArrayList<String> volume, String delimiter) 
  { 
    Iterator<Integer> it = patternList.iterator();    //Attach patternList to iterator for traversal 
     
    if(it.hasNext()) 
    { 
      while(it.hasNext())  
      { 
        String[] tempPat = volume.get(it.next()).split(delimiter); 
         
        System.out.print(translate(tempPat[tempPat.length - labelDistance]) + " " ); 
      } 
      System.out.println(); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      System.out.println("(empty)"); 
    } 
  }//end printPatternListWithLabels 
   
  public void printPatternListWithLabelsAsSummary(ArrayList<String> volume, String delimiter) 
  { 
    Iterator<Integer> it = patternList.iterator();    //Attach patternList to iterator for traversal 
    Map<String, Integer> map = new HashMap<String, Integer>(); //Summary of attack types 
     
    if(it.hasNext()) 
    { 
      while(it.hasNext())  
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      { 
        //Get pattern split into pieces 
        String[] tempPat = volume.get(it.next()).split(delimiter); 
         
        //Get attack type 
        String attackType = translate(tempPat[tempPat.length - labelDistance]); 
         
        //Add attack type to hashed array 
        if(map.containsKey(attackType)) 
        { 
          map.put(attackType, map.get(attackType) + 1); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
          map.put(attackType, 1); 
        } 
      } 
       
      //Print out summaries of all attack types 
      for(String name: map.keySet()) 
      { 
        String key = name.toString(); 
        String value = map.get(name).toString(); 
        System.out.print(key + " x" + value + " "); 
      } 
       
      System.out.println(); 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      System.out.println("(empty)"); 
    } 
  }//end printPatternListWithLabelsAsSummary 
   
   
   
  /*************************/ 
  /*** Private Functions ***/ 
  /*************************/ 
  private static boolean isNumeric(String str) 
  { 
    return str.matches("-?\\d+(\\.\\d+)?");  //match a number (latin digits) with optional '-' and decimal. 
  }//end isNumeric [Open Source] 
   
  private static String translate(String str) 
  { 
    String retStr = ""; 
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    //Remove ending period (if necessary) 
    str = str.replace(".", ""); 
     
    //Check string 
    switch(str) 
    { 
      case "back": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "buffer_overflow": retStr = "u2r"; break; 
      case "ftp_write": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "guess_passwd": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "imap": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "ipsweep": retStr = "probe"; break; 
      case "land": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "loadmodule": retStr = "u2r"; break; 
      case "multihop": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "neptune": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "nmap": retStr = "probe"; break; 
      case "perl": retStr = "u2r"; break; 
      case "phf": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "pod": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "portsweep": retStr = "probe"; break; 
      case "rootkit": retStr = "u2r"; break; 
      case "satan": retStr = "probe"; break; 
      case "smurf": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "spy": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "teardrop": retStr = "dos"; break; 
      case "warezclient": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "warezmaster": retStr = "r2l"; break; 
      case "normal": retStr = "normal"; break; 
      default: retStr = "str"; break; 
    } 
     
    return retStr; 
  }//end translate 
}//end Cluster 
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Appendix B.3: RunnableCluster class 
/* 
 * Name: Luis C. Armendariz 
 * Program Name: RunnableCluster 
 * Advisor: Dr. Roy S. Nutter 
 * Date: 11/4/2013 
 * Program Description: Implements the Runnable interface for assigning patterns to a K-Means cluster 
*/ 
 
import java.util.ArrayList;                 //Import ArrayList 
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger; 
 
public class RunnableCluster implements Runnable 
{ 
  private final int patternLoc;             //Pattern location in volume 
  private final ArrayList<String> volume; 
  private final ArrayList<Cluster> clusterList; 
  private final int[] clusterAssign; 
  private final int clusterLoops; 
  private final AtomicInteger clusterReassigns; 
  private final String delimiter; 
   
  /********************/ 
  /*** Constructors ***/ 
  /********************/ 
  public RunnableCluster(int patternLocation, ArrayList<String> volume, ArrayList<Cluster> clusterList, 
int[] clusterAssign, int clusterLoops, AtomicInteger clusterReassigns, String delimiter) 
  { 
    this.patternLoc = patternLocation; 
    this.volume = volume; 
    this.clusterList = clusterList; 
    this.clusterAssign = clusterAssign; 
    this.clusterLoops = clusterLoops; 
    this.clusterReassigns = clusterReassigns; 
    this.delimiter = delimiter; 
  }//end RunnableCluster 
   
   
  /********************/ 
  /**** Executors *****/ 
  /********************/ 
  public void run() 
  { 
    //Initialize variables 
    String tempPattern = "";           //Temporary Pattern (Whole) 
    String[] dataPattern;              //Temporary Pattern (Split into data elements) 
    Double tempFitness = 0.0;          //Temporary Fitness Value 
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    Double bestFitness = -1.0;         //Best Fitness Value for a temporary pattern 
    int bestCluster = -1;              //Best Cluster for temporary pattern 
    
    //Get pattern 
    tempPattern = volume.get(patternLoc); 
        
    //Split pattern using delimiter 
    dataPattern = tempPattern.split(delimiter); 
     
    //Get fitness with 1st cluster 
    bestFitness = clusterList.get(0).getFitness(dataPattern); 
    bestCluster = 0; 
     
    //Check fitness with other clusters and take lowest 
    for(int j=1, m=clusterList.size(); j < m; j++) 
    { 
      //Get fitness of cluster j 
      tempFitness = clusterList.get(j).getFitness(dataPattern); 
       
      //Best fitness is LOWEST of values 
      if(tempFitness < bestFitness) 
      { 
        bestFitness = tempFitness; 
        bestCluster = j; 
      } 
    } 
     
     
    //Check cluster assignment 
    if(clusterLoops == 0) 
    { 
      //Typecast pattern location to Object 
      Integer pattern = (Integer) patternLoc; 
       
      //Assign pattern to cluster with best fitness 
      clusterList.get(bestCluster).addPattern(pattern); 
       
      //Store cluster assignment 
      clusterAssign[patternLoc] = bestCluster; 
       
      //Increment reassignment count 
      clusterReassigns.incrementAndGet(); 
    } 
    else if(clusterAssign[patternLoc] != bestCluster) 
    { 
      //Typecast pattern location to Object 
      Integer pattern = (Integer) patternLoc; 
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      //Remove pattern from old cluster (if value exists) 
      clusterList.get(clusterAssign[patternLoc]).removePattern(pattern); 
       
      //Assign pattern to cluster with best fitness 
      clusterList.get(bestCluster).addPattern(pattern); 
       
      //Store cluster assignment 
      clusterAssign[patternLoc] = bestCluster; 
       
      //Increment reassignment count 
      clusterReassigns.incrementAndGet(); 
    }//end if-else 
  }//end run 
}//end RunnableCluster 
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Appendix B.4: RunnableCentroid class 
/* 
 * Name: Luis C. Armendariz 
 * Program Name: RunnableCentroid 
 * Advisor: Dr. Roy S. Nutter 
 * Date: 11/3/2013 
 * Program Description: Implements the Runnable interface for updating a K-Means cluster centroid 
*/ 
 
import java.util.ArrayList;                 //Import ArrayList 
import java.math.BigDecimal;                //Allows rounding of double type values 
 
public class RunnableCentroid implements Runnable 
{ 
  private final Cluster cluster; 
  private final ArrayList<String> volume; 
  private final String delimiter; 
   
  /********************/ 
  /*** Constructors ***/ 
  /********************/ 
  public RunnableCentroid(Cluster inCluster, ArrayList<String> inPatterns, String delim) 
  { 
    this.cluster = inCluster; 
    this.volume = inPatterns; 
    this.delimiter = delim; 
  }//end RunnableCentroid 
   
   
   
  /********************/ 
  /**** Executors *****/ 
  /********************/ 
  public void run() 
  { 
    String[] tempPattern; 
    ArrayList<Integer> patternList = cluster.getPatternList(); 
    int totalPatterns = cluster.getPatternListSize(); 
    String[] centroid = cluster.getCentroid(); 
    int labelDistance = cluster.getLabelDistance(); 
    int[] fitPattern = cluster.getFitPattern(); 
     
    //Check for fitness pattern (continuous data values) 
    if(fitPattern.length > 0) 
    { 
      /* PATTERN VALUE SUMATION */ 
      //Loop through list of patterns 
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      for(int i=0,j=totalPatterns; i < j; i++) 
      { 
        //Get a pattern and split into pieces 
        tempPattern = (volume.get(patternList.get(i))).split(delimiter); 
          
        //Loop through continuous data elements 
        for(int m=0,n=fitPattern.length; m < n; m++) 
        { 
          //Get location of continuous element 
          int cLoc = fitPattern[m]; 
            
          //If numerical values 
          if(isNumeric(centroid[cLoc]) && isNumeric(tempPattern[cLoc])) 
          { 
            //Get numerical value(s) 
            double cValue = Double.valueOf(centroid[cLoc]); 
            double pValue = Double.valueOf(tempPattern[cLoc]); 
              
            //Sum each NUMERICAL pattern value with respective centroid value 
            if(i == 0) 
            { 
              cValue = pValue;  //For 1st pattern, assign pattern element to centroid element 
            } 
            else 
            { 
              cValue = cValue + pValue; 
            } 
             
            //Convert back to a string & update centroid value 
            centroid[cLoc] = String.valueOf(cValue); 
          } 
        } 
      }//end for 
       
      /* CENTROID VALUE DIVIDES */ 
      //Loop through continuous data elements of centroid 
      for(int y=0,z=fitPattern.length; y < z; y++) 
      { 
        //Get location of continuous element 
        int cLoc = fitPattern[y]; 
            
        //If numerical value 
        if(isNumeric(centroid[cLoc])) 
        { 
          //Get numerical value 
          double cValue = Double.valueOf(centroid[cLoc]); 
           
          //Divide value by total number of patterns + 1 (for centroid) 
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          double newValue = (cValue / (totalPatterns + 1)); 
           
          //Round value to 2 decimal places 
          newValue = round(newValue, 2, BigDecimal.ROUND_HALF_UP); 
           
          //Convert value back to a string & update centroid value 
          centroid[cLoc] = String.valueOf(newValue); 
        } 
      }//end for 
    } 
    else 
    { 
      /* PATTERN VALUE SUMATION */ 
      //Loop through list of patterns 
      for(int i=0,j=totalPatterns; i < j; i++) 
      { 
        //Get a pattern and split into pieces 
        tempPattern = (volume.get(patternList.get(i))).split(delimiter); 
         
        //Loop through pattern elements [Minus labels at end of pattern] 
        for(int m=0,n=tempPattern.length-labelDistance; m < n; m++) 
        { 
          //If numerical value 
          if(isNumeric(centroid[m]) && isNumeric(tempPattern[m])) 
          { 
            //Get numeric value(s) 
            double cValue = Double.valueOf(centroid[m]); 
            double pValue = Double.valueOf(tempPattern[m]); 
             
            //Sum each NUMERICAL pattern value with respective centroid value 
            cValue = cValue + pValue; 
             
            //Convert back to a string & update centroid value 
            centroid[m] = String.valueOf(cValue); 
          } 
        } 
      }//end for 
        
      /* CENTROID VALUE DIVIDES */ 
      //Loop through each centroid value [Minus labels at end of pattern] 
      for(int y=0,z=centroid.length-labelDistance; y < z; y++) 
      { 
        //If numerical value 
        if(isNumeric(centroid[y])) 
        { 
          //Get numerical value 
          double cValue = Double.valueOf(centroid[y]); 
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          //Divide value by total number of patterns + 1 (for centroid) 
          double newValue = (cValue / (totalPatterns + 1)); 
           
          //Round value to 2 decimal places 
          newValue = round(newValue, 2, BigDecimal.ROUND_HALF_UP); 
           
          //Convert value back to a string & update centroid value 
          centroid[y] = String.valueOf(newValue); 
        } 
      }//end for 
   }//end if-else 
  }//end run 
   
  private static boolean isNumeric(String str) 
  { 
    return str.matches("-?\\d+(\\.\\d+)?");  //match a number (latin digits) with optional '-' and decimal. 
  }//end isNumeric [Open Source] 
   
  public static double round(double unrounded, int precision, int roundingMode) 
  { 
    BigDecimal bd = new BigDecimal(unrounded); 
    BigDecimal rounded = bd.setScale(precision, roundingMode); 
    return rounded.doubleValue(); 
  }//end round [Open Source] 
}//end RunnableCentroid 
 
 
